Explaining the Composition of an Individual's Political Repertoire: Voting and Protesting

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INTRODUCTION

Many agree that political participation has significantly diversified in last decades (Dalton 2014, Norris 2002, van Deth 2014). Whereas in the 1950s political participation was mostly limited to electoral participation, today there is much wider portfolio of activities available to citizens to affect politics. A considerable role in this portfolio is played by protest. Already in the 1960s there was a large expansion of demonstrations and other types of direct elite-challenging actions in the 1960s (Barnes and Kaase 1979, Inglehart 1977). These activities supplemented voting and activities related to elections, which were until that time considered as the sole proper form of mainstream political activity. Even after the peak mobilization of new social movements in 1960s and 1970s, political protest did not disappear, and instead grew further (Norris 2002, Dalton 2008a, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, Jennings and van Deth 1990).

How are protest and electoral participation related? Authors generally agree that the relationship between electoral and protest politics has so far received rather a little research attention (McAdam and Tarrow 2010; Blee and Currier 2006; Galais 2014). As McAdam and Tarrow put it, despite the fact that "elections and social movements are the two major forms of political conflict in democratic systems, … [the] inattention to the connection between the two fields [is] a serious lacuna" (McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 532). Surprisingly, vast majority of available studies on political participation has examined voting and protest separately and have not really studied how the two are related at the individual level in the repertoire of ordinary citizens. However, knowledge on how the two activities are combined and what determines the specific constellation of protest-voting repertoire is highly relevant in

contemporary discussion on declining voter turnout, the rise of radicalism or in a debate on democratic deficit in contemporary democracies.

The goal of the paper is to explain difference in the personal "toolbox" of citizens' political repertoire. Developing further the "actor-centered" perspective on political activism, we suggest that there is a different pathway of how people get activated to use various composition of protest and voting to get involved in politics. Drawing on various theories and literatures, we develop three explanations for each participatory type and differences among them: sole-voter, sole-protestor, and combined activism. The analyses uses European Social Survey 2002 data from 20 democracies to increase number of cases as protestors and their subcategories are rare cases.

REPERTOIRE PERSPECTIVE ON VOTING AND PROTESTING

When examining the relationship between voting and protesting almost all of the existing individual level studies are satisfied with looking at the correlation between the performances of the two activities. Analyses relying on correlations (Teorell et al. 2007, van Deth 2011, Saunders 2014, Anderson and Mendes 2006, Bean 1992) find no relationship between protesting and turning out a vote. Such result is usually interpreted as a falsification of the "crowding out hypothesis" that expects protesting to substitute voting.[1] Simultaneously, this result mostly leads to the conclusion that the two activities belong to different modes of participation and should be hence examined separately (but see Saunders 2014, Anderson and Mendes 2006, Bean 1992).

However, the lack of correlation, i.e. that people who perform one activity are not either less or more likely to perform the other activity, does not mean that the two are not connected at all. There might be a systematic pattern in how people combine the activities in their repertoires. Some citizens do not participate beyond casting a ballot; some only take part in protests while abstaining from voting, whereas others combine both activities in their repertoire. To examine how citizens link the two acts we need to skip from the traditional "activity-centered research program" that focuses on correlation between activities to what Oser (2014) calls "actor-centered research program" that approaches political participation from the perspective of individuals and the specific way of combination of the two activities. Social movement literature develops this approach under the concept of repertoire of

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[1] Interestingly, studies that do not use actual participation in the activity but self-reported propensity to perform the activity (protest potential, registration to vote, self-reported probability of vote) find positive relationship between the protesting and voting (Schussman and Soule 2005, Galais 2014, Barnes and Kaase 1979: 51, Marsh and Kaase 1979a: 93).

contention that describes "the distinctive constellations of tactics and strategies" (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 265) that are available to a given set of people to make political claims (Van Aler and Van Aelst 2010, McAdam et al. 2001, Taylor and Van Dyke 2004, Tilly 1978). Similarly, Verba and Nie specified types of participants according to a specific pattern of concentration of political activities (Verga and Nie 1972). Harris and Gillion (2010, p. 151, also Taylor and Van Dyke 2003) talk about a "toolbox of action" to recognize that citizens can use a wide variety of forms of actions. Lately, the repertoire or "actor-cantered research program" has been further developed by Oser (2014) that examines how a wide range of political activities is clustered among Americans and the effect of citizenship norms on these different repertoire sets.

In contrast to standard studies of political participation that examine political activities separately (e.g. explain protesting compared to non-protesting), the repertoire perspective focuses on the constellation of the political activities in hands of individual citizens. This means that the research question we are asking is not "why do people perform specific activities?", as in classical participation studies, but "why do they use a specific participatory portfolio?" We believe that such repertoire distinction is crucial as different types of people tend to combine various strategies. According to the repertoire perspective, people do not combine political activities randomly, rather the different constellation of participatory repertoires signify a different pathways of how people get involved in politics. Hence, the repertoire actor-oriented approach used in this study suggests that there is not a single homogenous pathway of how people get involved in particular political activities. In contrast, there are different path-ways of how people become active and they differ for different types of activists that combine various repertoire strategies. Specifically, we for instance claim that reasons that lead people, who vote, to extent their activities to protest participation are different than those than those factors that are responsible for protest mobilization of people, who do not get involved in politics via electoral channels. Surprisingly, the repertoire perspective on the relationship between voting and protesting has not been examined empirically into a greater detail. Some studies have analyzed voting among protestors (Heaney and Rojas 2007, Rudig 2011). Exceptionally, McVeigh and Sikking (2001) have examined why conservative Christian voters combine voting with protest. This paper aims at developing this research agenda further.

To account for the variation in repertoire constellations we draw on several theories and different types of literature. Traditionally, studies have emphasized similarity of various political activities and have used more or less the same explanation – Civic voluntarism

model – to explain both, voting and protesting (Norris 2002, Verba et al. 1995, Dalton 2008a, Armingeon 2007, Verba et al. 1995). In a nutshell, the model expects that participation in general will be performed by people who (a) have a higher socio-economic status providing them with the necessary resources to overcome costs of participation, (b) have political motivations, such as political interest, and (c) are recruited into action by their social networks and political elites.

In contrast to the Civic voluntarism model, that emphasizes similarity across activities, we draw on studies that show differences in predictors of voting and protesting to develop theories explaining differences in people's repertoire constellation. Specifically, we take more into account literature specializing only in voter turnout as it is mostly overlooked in studies explaining voting along with other political activities. We also draw on alternative theories used mainly in social movement theory, such as grievance theory, that despite their plausibility have not received much empirical support (McAdam 1982, Norris et al. 2005). We believe that one of the reasons why such theories were not supported might be the fact that the theories have not been tested on adequate outcomes. Despite theorizing about protest as activity exclusive to voting, tests of the grievance theory using the classical action-oriented approach do not take into account the fact that most of protestors are simultaneously voters.

Figure 1 pictures a descriptive typology that classifies individual citizens by their combination of the two activities. The following text discusses each type of participant and suggests explanation of what factors lead people to opt for a specific type of action repertoire.

Figure 1: Vote and Protest Action Repertoire

1	Sole-voters	Combined activism
0	Passive	Sole-protestors
	0	1

Voting

Protest

Sole-voters

The existence of voters, who do not perform other activities beyond casting a ballot, is not that surprising. Voting is the most popular participatory activity since it directly decides on the selection of political leaders; and is the most low-cost political activity for most of the people (Verba et al 1995). By participation in elections the democratic governments and the whole democratic system gain legitimacy. Moreover, voting is, in contrast to protesting, supposed to assure political equality, with the rule of one person one vote (for more see Teorell et al. 2007a). Hence for elitist democrats and authors worrying about political inequality, the category of sole-voters seems to embody the most wanted type of participant.

Explanation of sole-voting compared to people who remain passive probably corresponds to what is already well known from studies on determinants of voting as a very large majority of voters do not protest. Even though majority of literature on electoral participation includes social status and other demographic variables into explanation, scholars disagree on what these variables measure. Are they measures of resources? Or do they reflect motivations or previous socialization? In addition to that, the effect of these variables hardly ever crosses the statistical and substantial significance after the inclusion of motivations into the model. However, an average, voters have more resources in terms of social status and political experience (age).

Moreover, motivations are crucial for electoral participation. Rational choice theories suggest that people vote only if they can get reasonably high benefit from voting (Downs 1957). Those benefits are based on policy distance between the parties and the voters. Besides these instrumental motivations, voters yield normative motivations, especially sense of duty to vote (Blais 2000). Besides that, voters are motivated also by the desire to express the support for their preferred party, even though it does not have to have the strength to win election or just a seat (Schuessler 2000). Electoral participation is increased also by mobilization, either by political parties and candidates, or by interest groups like trade-unions, church, or other voluntary organizations (Rosenstone, Hansen 1993).

More interesting is the question of why voters do not extend their repertoire to protesting. A straightforward explanation is that these people might not have a reason to protest. In other words, these people might lack grievances that would trigger their participation. This might imply that people, who only vote, are on the winning side in the society and fully satisfied. Hence, we can expect that people, who only vote are better off in the society in terms of their socio-economic status than people who perform both activities.

Combined Activism

The upper right quadrant includes people, who supplement the two activities – vote once a four years and protest in between elections. This category of participants corresponds to most of the contemporary literature that sees protest and voting as complementary activities that supplement each other. According to this perspective, if there was ever a sharp exclusive boundary between protest and electoral politics, nowadays it has diminished. Scholars of contentious politics claim that protest has conventionalized as a mainstream participatory tool. Contemporary democracies are "social movement societies" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) or we live in a "movement world" (Goldstone 2004) where protest is used as a continuation of institutional politics. Similarly, researchers of contemporary political participation talk about the process of expansion and diversification of political action repertoires (Dalton 2008b, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, Micheletti 2003, Stolle and Hooghe 2005, van Deth 2001, Dalton 2008a, Norris 2002, Teorell et al. 2007a, Norris et al. 2005, van Deth 2011, Verba et al 1995).

According to some authors, this action repertoire is the most beneficial for functioning of democracies. People combining both activities are "hyper activists." According to participatory democrats, people should not limit their involvement in politics to pure voting, but should get involved in politics also in times between elections and use strategies that are more flexible, allow to addresses specific issues and propose solutions. Specifically protest is by some perceived as elite-challenging activity that increases accountability of political elites and attracts attention to new or abandoned topics. What factors induce people to become "hyper activist"? These factors will probably correspond to what we already know about determinants of protesting as the vast majority of protestors vote. Examining demonstrations against the war in Iraq, Rudig (2010) shows that across the eight countries studied the number of protestors, who reported that they voted in the last national elections ranged from 77 % to 91 %.

The explanation of protest participation advocated by literature that sees protest as a continuation of conventional politics uses more or less the same explanatory factors to account for protest that are used to explain participation at conventional activities including voting (with the exception of age). The general interpretation is that a typical protester is an "educated, middle class, young person, who is well interconnected in the society." Specifically, when it comes to resources we expect that, as protesting is more demanding on costs than voting, we should expect that being a hyper activist requires more resources. We can expect that for protesting, particularly time and skills should be more relevant.

As regards political motivations, attitudes and values relevant for voting will undoubtedly play a role. However, a crucial role in inducing people into hyper activism should be played by attitudes generally related to modernization theory (Inglehart 1997, Norris et al. 2005, Welzel and Deutsch 2012). As the post-modernization theory argues, the development of elite challenging activities should be a result of the value change that took place in post-industrial democracies. Value change includes in general increased politicization, increased in interest in various political issues, critical and independent thinking, lower deference to and increased criticism of political authorities, rise of self-expressive values, aspiration for active, more focused and creative political engagement, rise of post-materialist values such as environmental topics and human rights (Inglehart 1997, Norris et al. 2005, Welzel and Deutsch 2012, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Norris 2002, Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Dalton) . All of these attitudes should lead people to get involved in elite-challenging types of action such as protesting. The above mentioned prediction for higher socio-economic status of such protestors is in line with post-materialist theory as well. As suggested by the theory, post-materialists are not non-materialists or people suffering from socio-economic grievances. In contrast, post-materialists in general are people who experience socio-economic well-being and have very high cognitive resources.

Although some have deduced from the post-materialist theory that post-materialism, while increasing protest, should also decrease voting (Inglehart 1997, Norris et al. 2005, Welzel and Deutsch 2012), we suggest together with other literature that post-materialist factors do not have such effect. Firstly, the self-expressive narrative implying rejection of disciplined elite-led style of traditional politics applies rather to party membership than to voter turnout. Cognitive mobilization, which is an important process of modernization, helps establish a new group of apartisans, who are, however, highly politically involved and independent (Dalton x). Secondly, post-materialism does not necessarily mean rejection of parliamentary arena as also post-materialist parties, such as Greens, run or are successful in elections. Also, research examining the character of "old" style electoral politics and "new" style self-expressive values has not shown that the two are exclusive (Dalton 2008). Specifically, Dalton's study of norms of good citizenship emphasizing the difference between "self-expressive-style" norms of engaged citizenship and "old-electoral-politics-style" norms of citizen duty, shows that though the two types form separate dimensions of values, the two dimensions are widely spread and are still positively correlated (Dalton 2008).

Summed up, compared to people, who do not get involved in politics, repertoire combining protest and voting should be performed more by younger people who score high on socio-economic resources and hence are more or less privileged and well off, have very high self-expressive-style values, such as political involvement, care strongly about various political issues, are critical to political elites, have strong norms of citizenship in both, citizen duty and engaged citizenship dimension and are members of parties and other voluntary groups.

Sole-Protestors

Originally, studies conceptualized protest as an alternative and rival strategy to institutional electoral politics (Garner and Zald 1987, Tilly 1988, Goldstone 2004, Katzenstein 2010). This category of people, who only protest but do not vote, is shown in a right bottom quadrant of Figure 1. As already said, non-voting protestor is not a typical participant of demonstrations in contemporary democracies, as most protestors take part at elections. Though pure protesting is not very common repertoire, such category of participants is very relevant. The fact that there is a distinct group of protestors who are at the same time alienated from electoral politics goes against the ideals promoted by representative democracy. Moreover, this category is a puzzling fact for standard participation theory as such participants perform much more demanding type of activity (protest) and do not take part in elections, which should be the least costly participatory act.

What factors activate people to get involved in protest (but not voting)? Classical Civic Voluntarism Model would predict even for this group of participants that, people need resources, pro-participatory motivations and mobilization. Regarding resources, this theory expects that all types of activism necessarily need some level of resources as every action bring costs. We can expect that for protesting, particularly time and skills should be more relevant. Hence higher education and being a student should have positive effect.

In contrast, classical collective action and grievance theories, which pictured protest as activity exclusive to voting, suggest that grievances drive protest participation. They suggest that participatory choices are a result of the "unequal distribution of rewards (money, status, and power) and opportunities or life chances in a society" (Snow and Soule 2010: 28). Troublesome socio-structural and material conditions, immiseration or exclusion should attract individuals to protest. Several versions of this theory and a number of mechanisms of how socio-economic grievances affect protest participation have been specified. Some authors focus on objective grievances, which indicate absolute deprivation, while others emphasize

perceived deprivation where people feel frustrated by their current situation in comparison to different times or to various reference groups, which should lead them to protest. To examine this dimension of socio-economic grievance theory, which relates to the exclusion of protestors from voting with the prevailing social status hierarchy, we include three indicators: marginalized position within a labor force and discrimination. While being unemployed or manual worker tap individuals' economic capital reflecting the socio-economic roots of political exclusion, discrimination indicates other potential grievances, such as race or women's discrimination. This study will also examine the role of citizenship.

Political attitudes and values should also matter for inducing people into protest. In general, protestors should care about politics and have strong or extreme opinions on political issues. At the same time, they should be dissatisfied with politics, as suggested by grievance theory, but score high on values of internal efficacy and express values of engaged citizenship in contrast to people who are not active.

Drawing on the resource mobilization theory or the political participation literature focused on mobilization, the specific political repertoire combining protest with avoidance of voting by non-privileged people can be explained in terms of selecting recruitment by specific mobilizing actors into protesting but not voting (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, Uhlaner 1989). Social movements can make the grievances of the non-privileged and excluded social strata salient and may overcome the costs of protest participation, while political parties and other organizations that recruit voters disregard this group of citizens and target the privileged in their mobilization efforts (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).

Why do these people abstain from voting when they have already crossed the threshold of getting active via protest? Grievance theory implies that protestors "eschew politics through proper channels" (McAdam and Snow 97: 326) because they lack access to traditional line of political influence and are unable to pursue their demands through elections (Goldstone xx, Taylor and van Dyke x). The reason why disadvantaged and immiserated protestors, who come from the lower strata of the socio-economic hierarchy, fight for their demands and bypass voting is that they see the electoral arena of conventional politics as closed for them: they do not have an access or chance their voice will be heard. Only the demands of privileged and well-off are communicated through conventional channels of electoral participation and are represented by politicians in elected assemblies. The interests of exploited and oppressed are overlooked. In summary, the unprivileged and immiserated are more likely to protest; and at the same time avoid voting because they do not have any other

option where they can successfully communicate their grievances (Snow and Soule 2010). Hence particularly important factors explaining the difference between pure protestors and hyper activists should be indicators of socio-economic exclusion (discrimination, low SES, unemployment etc.).

Sole protestors do not need to abstain from electoral participation only because the doors to conventional political channels are closed but because they do not want to. Another explanation of why protestors do not vote is based on the idea of alienation from the partisan and electoral politics, i.e. lacking or having negative psychological affective attachment to political parties. This explanation draws on the literature focused on anti-party sentiments (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996, Torcal, Gunther and Montero 2002, Rudig 2010) and political disaffection (Torcal and Montero 2006). Alienation from partisan and electoral politics has two main objects of evaluation: parties and elections, which are both crucial institutions of political representation. If they are not perceived to work properly, then people get alienated from the parties and election process and quit voting. Put simply, protestors do not vote because they think that political parties are unresponsive to the demands of voters and do not address their issues, and see elections as useless as they do not bring any change. Specifically, protestors see protesting as a viable alternative to partisan politics and hence do not vote because they don't believe that parties are able or willing to address the issues of most concern to citizens.

Alienation from partisan and electoral politics has two main components: disaffection with political parties as institutions and lack of partisan attachments. The first is defined as a belief about the lack of responsiveness of political parties and elections to citizen demands and a lack of confidence in these institutions of political representation (Gunther and Montero 2006, Poguntke 1996). Thus, disaffection with political parties as institutions merges two political culture concepts: sense of external political efficacy and trust in political institutions such as political parties (Gunther and Montero 2006). These concepts represent beliefs about the influence of the individual on conventional electoral politics. They cover – in negative terms – indifference to the electoral political institutions, cynicism, and distrust of political parties.

The second component of alienation from partisan and electoral politics is the ability and willingness to think about the self in terms of classical political parties. On one hand, this includes party identity, which is a psychological attachment to a political party. It has both affective (Campbell et al. 1960) and cognitive (Fiorina 1981) component. Party identification is thought to be of a long-term nature where political socialization plays an important role

(Campbell et al 1960; Greene 1999), even though short-term performance evaluations seem to have an effect as well. It is considered one of the main driving forces behind electoral participation in general (Campbell et al. 1960). Party identifiers do not have to compare parties and think about which party to support; they just have their 'own' party to support (Schuessler 2000). Attachment to a political party positively motivates protestors to turn out to vote, and we can expect that not having any party identification is responsible for electoral abstention. Without party identification, other factors have to play a stronger role in motivating and mobilizing protestors to vote. Hence, we hypothesize that protestors with no party identification will abstain more than protestors with partisanship.

Voter abstention of protestors might not originate only from the fact that protestors are alienated from party politics as they consider parties and elections as not working properly. Another reason might lie in the fact that sole protestors are radicals that do not vote because they are against democracy and the basic principles of the political system. This explanation draws on a perspective advocated mainly by an older political participation or collective action literature (Parkin 1968, Gurr 1970, Crozier et al. 1975), which saw protestors as "anti-state rebels", who protest because of their disaffected radicalism and threaten conventional channels of electoral politics (Norris et al. 2005). Traditionally, protesting has been perceived as a deviant and disruptive opposition strategy contrasting it with conventional electoral politics that is seen to be oriented toward maintaining the existing social order (Smelser 1962, Turner and Killian 1987, Gurr 1970, Huntington, Piven and Cloward 1977, Tilly 1978, for review see Snow and Soule 2010, Buechler 2000, 2004). This aspect of the collective behavior theory pictured protestors as irrational, extremist mentally sick dangerous individuals, who promote non-democratic values, are violent radicals and threaten the principles of democratic state (Buechler 2000). Leaving aside the question of rationality and the mental health of protestors, we focus mainly on the political radicalism aspect to explain non-voting among some protestors. Politically radical protestors eschew voting because of their deep-seated anti-system political views.

DATA AND METHODS

Research design and data

Since the amount of protestors in a country usually does not go above five percent, protestors are very hardly-to-reach by one-shot single-country nationally representative surveys that are usually used to study political participation. One survey usually includes around 1000 cases to represent the whole national population, which means that it includes only around 50

protestors. Given we are interested in subcategories of protestors (voting and non-voting protestors) the numbers further decrease. From this point of view, protestors and their subcategories are rare cases. This paper chooses one of the available solutions to cope with that problem (King and Zeng 2001): to use a large dataset to make sure they are enough of such cases. From this reason, we use survey data from a larger number of countries to get a large number of protestors and their categories. Specifically, we use the European Social Survey Citizenship 2002 that includes 20 democracies and covers a large number of indicators measuring concepts included in our explanation of political action repertoire.

Participant types

The dependent variable in this study is a combination of categories of voting and protesting. Voting is indicated by participation in the most recent general elections (non-voting is coded 0 and participation 1). Protestors not eligible to vote because of age ($\leq$ 18 years) have been excluded from the analysis. Protest is measured by a question if a respondent took part in a demonstration in last year (participation 1, non-participation 0). We recoded the two variables into participant types: Combined activism (protest = 1, voting = 1), sole-voters (protest = 0, voting = 1), sole-protestors (protest = 1, voting = 0), and passive (protest = 0, voting = 0). Figure 1 shows the distribution of participant categories across all included countries.

Resources

As indictors of resources we include education (three categories of higher education compared to elementary education) and being a student. Education should indicate civic skills while being a student should indicate more time (it also captures structural availability for mobilization).

Socio-economic grievances

Socio-economic grievances are measured using three indicators: 1) Position within labour force: unemployed, not in labor force, unqualified workers compared to employed indicate objective socio-economic grievances. 2) As perceived grievances we include discrimination. The ESS asks on a number of reasons why a respondent feels discriminated. Factor analysis has shown that there are two dimensions of discrimination: one capturing discrimination based on ethnicity, race and language and other more symbolic types of discrimination based on gender, sexuality, age etc. 3) We include citizenship compared to respondents that do not have citizenship in the country of residence.

Motivations

Partisan attachment is measured using a standard party identification question (0 no PID, 1 fairly and not at all strong identification, 2 very strong identification).

Radicalism is measured using a satisfaction with the functioning of democracy item. Only those who are completely dissatisfied (i.e. score zero on a 0 to 10 point scale) are considered in this study to be 'radicals.'

To measure norms of a good citizen we replicate Dalton's construction of two types of these norms: self-expressive style values of "norms of engaged citizenship" and classical old-politics style of values – "citizen duty". Factor scores derived from Principal Component analysis are used as a measure of the two types of citizenship values (the first factor - citizens should form their own opinions, support the worse off, be active in politics, and be active in voluntary groups, the second factor – duty to report crime, always obey the law, serve in the military, serve on a jury, and vote in elections).

Clear policy preference: Ess asked on dis/agreement on a number of issues (government intervention in economy, reduction of inequality, environment, gay and lesbian rights, protection of employees, extremist parties etc.). We coded people who strongly agreed or strongly disagreed as extremists and summed up the extreme answers.

Political discontent combines measures of external political efficacy (politicians not interested, politicians care only about votes) and trust to government and parliament. Factor analysis showed that the four variables form one factor. Factors scores are used.

Politicization combines measures of internal efficacy, political trust and political discussion. Factor analysis showed that all variables form one factor. Factor scores are used.

Mobilization

Mobilization is indicated by membership in group. Party mobilization is measured by membership in political parties as dummy variable where 1 indicates party membership. Non-partisan mobilization is indicated by a sum of membership in all other voluntary organizations covered by ESS.

Controls

The models also control for age, which is measured as a continuous variable, and sex, which is a dummy variable coded 1 for males.

Analysis

To analyze the four categories of participants we use multinomial regression. The models compares the three participant categories to passive (people, who do not perform either voting or protesting) to examine different pathway of how the three distinct groups of participants get mobilized. First we examine only socio-economic factors and grievances to see their effect without mediation by political motivations and mobilization. The second model adds political motivations and mobilization.

As we are not primarily interested in cross-country variation, we approach the differences across countries as an error and control for it. To make sure that the cross-country data can be pooled we will run a chow-test.[2] The models presented have fixed effects for countries to control for unmeasured heterogeneity across the national contexts analyzed. As a robustness-check, the models will be re-estimated using multilevel analyses.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the results for factors indicating socio-economic status. How does socio-economic status determine repertoire people use in politics? In contrast to the grievance theory, which predicts grievances to trigger sole-protesting, the results show that neither objective (position within labor force) nor perceived discrimination (based on ethnicity and race) do activate people to protest. The only grievance measure that increases likelihood of becoming a sole-protestor is perceived discrimination on the basis of sexuality, gender etc. The reason why this type of discrimination activates people to sole-protesting might be the fact that such issues are more salient. Also perceived discrimination on the basis of sexuality or gender is not primarily related to economic exclusion and redistribution. This corresponds to the fact that also sole-protestors need higher resources. Higher education that indicates skills and interest in this model increases likelihood of sole-protesting. Similarly being a student has a positive effect probably because students have more time and are structurally available for mobilization. In sum, however, though grievance do not trigger protest, they do not decrease it. People with or without socio-economic grievances have the same chances to get involved in protesting.

Although grievances do not function as triggers of protest mobilization, they function as effective obstacles of voting. Surprisingly, all measures of grievances decrease likelihood of sole-voting compared to politically passive. If a person is unemployed, not in labor force,

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[2] We examined the direct fixed effects of countries as well as interaction effects between variables of our interest and the country dummies performed to make sure that the effects do not differ across countries.

unqualified worker or discriminated, she is less likely to vote than people, who have jobs. These results practically mean that people, who are at the bottom of socio-economic status, are excluded from electoral politics. Also people with higher levels of education are more likely to vote than people with basic education. Overall, the effect of socio-economic factors on sole-voting shows surprisingly a very bad picture. People, who are more likely to have their voice heard in electoral politics are those, who do not belong to socio-economically excluded groups and have higher education.

The option to combine both types of activism does not really solve the elitist character of voting. In line with our theory, people who combine both activities and are hence "hyper activists" are in many respects even more distant to socio-economically excluded groups. Specifically, higher education affects a lot whether people will remain passive or use both types of activities. Similarly, unemployed, people not in labor force, and unqualified workers are less likely to be "hyper activists" than employed. Compared to sole-voting, perceived discrimination does not decrease likelihood of being "hyper activists." People become hyper activists regardless their ethnic and race discrimination. However, perceived discrimination in terms of sexuality, age, and gender increases the likelihood that a politically passive person will become a hyper activist.

The model includes also citizenship, which is understandable necessary precondition of voting. However, very interesting result is in the case of sole-voting as not being a citizen increases likelihood of sole-protesting. This suggest that there is a group that has the capacity and willingness to participate, as these people are more likely to protest, but cannot extent their activities to voting as they are not citizens.

Why do not the two sole-participants extent their activities to include the other one as well? As the difference in coefficients of education shows, the lack of higher levels of education makes it hard for both, sole-voters and sole-protestors, to become hyper activists. In addition, socio-economic exclusion decreases chances of sole-protestors to extent their repertoire also to voting.

Table 2 expands the model explaining the three types of activism with political motivations and mobilization. What induces people to become sole-protestors? As we can see, almost all socio-economic variables lost their significance. Especially, as the effect of education on sole-protesting disappeared, we suggest that the reason why it mattered in previous model was not the mechanism of skills, but rather political motivations. Only being a student (indicator of time resources and mobilization) and not having a citizenship predicts this repertoire. In line with our theory, higher level of engagement-based citizenship norms,

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higher politicization, higher discontent with politics, stronger political opinions are more likely to get involved in sole-protesting. In contrast to partisan alienation hypothesis, the fact that people have party that they identify with (though very little) increases likelihood of sole-protesting. The reason here might be that in case of people with weak party identification, the circumstational voter abstention (e.g. because of vacation) might play a bigger role than for people with stronger party identification. However, in accordance with this theory, the lack of strong party identification and the lack of party membership explains, why sole-protestors do not vote as well. Similarly, radicalism (extreme dissatisfaction with democracy) triggers people to sole-voting. In accordance with our theory, mobilization via membership in non-partisan voluntary groups plays a strong role in people's activation into sole-protesting.

Social status and grievance predictors of combined activism compared to political passivity remain more or less the same as in the previous model. All post-materialist-like and pro-participatory attitudes and values increase the likelihood of becoming hyper activist as suggested by our theory. All these factor play rather strong role hence the gap compared to people who are less politicized, have lower duty and engagement-based citizenship norms, lower party identification in the chance of becoming hyper activist is bigger. Surprisingly, political discontent has a negative effect. This contrasts to interpretations of the post-materialist theory suggesting that the lack of political satisfaction expresses assertive critical citizenship. Political discontent predicts only sole-protesting and also prevents sole-protestors from extending their action repertoire to voting. Surprisingly, radicalism also increases the chance that people will combine the two activities. In accordance with the theory, mobilization through party membership and membership in voluntary organizations plays a big role for combined activism.

What are the factors that induce people only to vote? The socio-economic factors from the previous model remain more or less the same. Also political motivations and mobilization predict sole-voting in line with the theory. People, who have higher level of duty-based citizenship, are more satisfied with politics, are more politicized and have stronger party identification are more likely to get involved in voting. Surprisingly, people who are politically passive are less likely to become sole-voters if they stronger political opinions on political issues.

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Table 1. Different types of political participation, socio-economic status, and grievances (multinomial logistic regression)

	super-activist vs. apathy		voter vs. apathy		demonstrator vs. apathy	
Social status						
level of education (elementary=base)						
lower secondary	0.505	***	0.145	**	0.437	#
upper secondary	1.046	***	0.571	***	0.449	#
tertiary	1.919	***	0.979	***	1.011	***
position within labour force (employed=base)						
student	0.913	***	0.153	*	0.929	***
Grievances						
unemployed	-0.438	***	-0.500	***	-0.179	
not in labor force (pensioner, disabled, other)	-0.398	***	-0.091	*	-0.249	
unqualified workers	-0.654	***	-0.294	***	-0.101	
discriminated group (ethnic, race)	0.017		-0.594	***	0.306	
discriminated group (sexuality, age, disability)	0.600	***	-0.269	***	0.694	***
no citizenship	-3.156	***	-3.102	***	0.507	**
Control variables						
age	0.129	***	0.115	***	-0.022	
age sq.	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	0.000	
sex (male=1)	0.293	***	0.078	*	0.414	***
constant	-1.178	**	1.644	***	-2.878	***

Source: ESS 2002.

Note: Entries are logit coefficients of multinomial logistic regression. Models include country dummies (not presented). Nagelkerke R^2= 0.208; McFadden's Adj R^2=0.115. N=37088.

*Sign: #< 0.1; *< 0.05; **< 0.01; *** < 0.001.*

Table 2. Different types of political participation, socio-economic status, grievances, motivations and mobilization (multinomial logistic regression)

	super-activist vs. apathy		voter vs. apathy		demonstrator vs. apathy	
Social status						
level of education (elementary=base)						
lower secondary	0.147		-0.050		0.238	
upper secondary	0.331	**	0.154	*	-0.026	
tertiary	0.733	***	0.288	***	0.283	
position within labour force (employed=base)						
student	0.488	***	-0.169	*	0.696	**
Grievances						
unemployed	-0.242	#	-0.455	***	-0.094	
not in labor force (pensioner, disabled, other)	-0.314	***	-0.142	**	-0.077	
unqualified workers	-0.486	***	-0.209	***	0.041	
discriminated group (ethnic, race)	-0.001		-0.524	***	0.224	
discriminated group (sexuality, age, disability)	0.249	*	-0.278	**	0.380	
no citizenship	-3.120	***	-3.164	***	0.544	*
Motivations						
duty-based citizenship norm	0.359	***	0.492	***	-0.007	
engagement-based citizenship norm	0.369	***	0.143	***	0.335	***
political discontent	-0.552	**	-0.952	***	0.658	***
politicisation	3.080	***	1.261	***	2.154	***
clear policy preferences	0.063	***	-0.033	**	0.103	**
party identification (no=base)						
fairly and not at all strong	0.576	***	0.377	***	0.529	**
very strong	1.156	***	0.766	***	0.215	
radicalism (very dissatisfied with functioning of the democracy)	0.341	*	-0.087		0.654	**
Mobilization						
party membership	1.371	***	0.841	***	0.428	
membership in voluntary orgnization	0.315	***	0.146	***	0.317	***
Control variables						
age	0.072	***	0.089	***	-0.075	**
age sq.	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	0.000	#
sex (male=1)	-0.116	#	-0.092	*	0.268	#
constant	1.968	***	4.075	***	-1.414	#

Source: ESS 2002.

Note: Entries are logit coefficients of multinomial logistic regression. Models include country dummies (not presented). Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.316$; McFadden's Adj $R^2 = 0.188$. N=31160.

*Sign: #< 0.1; *< 0.05; **< 0.01; *** < 0.001.*