Privileged post-materialists or excluded radicals?
Different pathways of protest participation in a case-control study

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Introduction

Lately we have seen an extensive mobilization of anti-austerity demonstrations and Occupy movements. According to some scholars these movements signify a new generation of protest mobilization that is different from so far dominant "new" social movements (della Porta 2014). New social movements were related to post-materialist issues and emphasized symbolic politics and recognition of alternative identities. Anti-austerity and Occupy movements, in contrast, mobilize in the context of economic and political crisis of capitalism and get active around issues of socio-economic inequalities and material redistribution (della Porta 2014).

The changing character of protest politics highlights the fact that, probably, there are diverse pathways of how people get active in protest. While protest has been performed by more resourceful people with higher socioeconomic status that have post-materialist values, the newly growing anti-austerity and Occupy protests seem to be performed by people, who are socio-economically disadvantaged, poor and politically marginalized. Surprisingly, available research has not examined the diverse pathways of individual participation at protest. Vast majority of studies assumes that there is only one way of how people get active in protest (via higher individual resources and postmaterialist values) and models participation of a typical protestor regardless a type of protest she participates at.

The goal of this article is to provide a theoretically driven comparison of individual level processes leading people to protest in different types of demonstrations. The article distinguishes between "movements of affluence" (new social movements) and "movements of crisis" (contemporary anti-austerity and Occupy movements) (Kerbo 1982; della Porta 2014). It suggests that the "well-off postmaterialist" explanation drawn from the mainstream political participation literature should explain participation in the first type of movements while grievance theories will probably account for participation at the new contemporary wave of activism, such as anti-austerity demonstrations or in protests of unemployed, homeless, radicals, and ethnic minorities. To examine that, the article relies on an original design of a case-control study combining three datasets: Two targeted surveys of protestors at two different types of protest (1) the Prague Pride organized in Prague in 2013 to represent the new social movement type of protest and 2) an anti-austerity demonstration organized in Prague in 2013 called "The end of Godfathers" in 2013) and data representative to the Czech population (3) Czech wave of the International Social Survey Programm from 2014).

The results support the notion that there is actually no universal pathway of how people get active in protest. The individual level processes responsible for protest participation differ across the two types of protest as predicted by the theory. Participation at the Prague Pride is explained by higher education, higher income, being a student, and post-materialist ethics. On the contrary, poor people, unemployed, having extreme leftist values and extremely dissatisfied with politics were more likely to participate at the End of Godfathers march. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, higher education facilitates participation at both protests.

Participation at protest

Participation at protest has become a fairly widespread political activity in contemporary democracies. Western Europe and North America experienced first large scale protest participation between the end of 1950s and 1970s in demonstrations organized by Civil rights, environmental, feminist movement, and demonstrations against the war in Vietnam etc. (Barnes and Kaase 1979, Inglehart 1977). Even after the peak of the protest wave of new social movements, political protest did not disappear, and instead grew further (Norris 2002, Dalton 2008a, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, Jennings and van Deth 1990). Studies report for some countries even 25 percent increase in the rate of people who participate in protest nowadays compared to 1970s (Norris 2002, Norris, Walgrave and Aelst 2005l). Generally, in contemporary Western democracies there are from 10 to 40 percent of citizens who have some experience with participation at the demonstration (Norris et al. 2005).

Why do people protest? Vast majority of existing literature suggests that next to other factors protest has been a matter of affluent socio-economic resources. For instance, in line with the classical Civic Voluntarism Model studies show positive effect of socio-economic status (SES) on individual protest (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Schussman and Soule 2005; Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Teorell and Tobiasen 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 190). Similarly, resource mobilization has emphasized the role of collective resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Proponents of post-materialist theory suggest that experience of affluent socio-economic resources during socialization develops post-materialist values that induce individuals into "elite challenging" protest (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Welzel and Deutsch 2012). Though individual studies in mainstream political participation and social movement literature differ in how much they emphasize the positive effect of individual resources or of a higher socio-economic status,[1] they all agree that there is not a negative effect: socio-economic hardship should not induce protest.

However, the above mentioned anti-austerity protests or protest of socio-economically deprived people in general suggest a different story. For instance, protestors taking part in the anti-austerity demonstrations against socio-economic hardship and exploitation belonged to "social precariat" (well-educated but unemployed or underemployed young people with insecure jobs) (della Porta 2014; Standing 2011; but see Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). These protestors do not seem to match the picture of "well-off postmaterialists" but rather correspond to expectations of grievance theories (Gurr 1970; Piven and Cloward 1977; Turner and Killian 1987; Smelser 1962; Buechler 2004; Snow and Soule 2009). In general, grievance theories suggest that protest is generated by "unequal distribution of rewards (money, status, and power) and opportunities or life chances in a society" (Snow and Soule 2011: 28). According to grievance theories it should be primarily those who are exploited, oppressed, and immiserated who are more likely to get involved in protest than those who are well off.

Obviously, the two perspectives – resource and grievance – draw opposing implications of why people protest. Resource and grievance theory have usually been presented as competing

[1] Unlike political participation literature, resource mobilization theory does not claim that individual affluence of resources is needed; rather, it suggests that organizational resources at the level of groups induce protest. However, mainstream social movement literature explicitly predicts zero effect of socio-economic hardship on protest and does not usually even take into account socio-economic hardship in empirical studies of protest (Snow and Soule 2009, 42–51; Buechler 2004, 51–53).

explanations and have been tested as rival theories. Most of empirical studies show support for the "well-off postmaterialist" explanation, grievance theories have been rather neglected in empirical studies after initial mixed or unsupportive results (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; Schlozman and Verba 1979). However, we can find a few newer studies that support grievance theories and show a negative effect of socio-economic factors (Opp 2000; Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Dixon and Roscigno 2003; Olzak and Shanahan 1996; Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005). What stands behind the mixed findings? Is protest a matter of resources or grievances? The main argument of this paper is that both theories are valid as they capture diverse paths of how people get involved in protest (also Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Protest can have very different character: e.g. strikes of trade unions, direct actions of radical rightwing extremists, LGBT parade or a demonstration of environmentalists. It is plausible to expect that there are different sets of factors determining people's involvement in different types of protest.

Surprisingly, the possibility that determinants of protest participation can vary across demonstrations has been completely overlooked by political participation literature. Studies in political participation treat protestors as a homogenous entity and model a typical protestor regardless of what type of protest they participate at (Schussman and Soule 2003, Welzel and Deutsch 2012, Benson and Rochon 2004, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007, Armingeon 2007).[2] In contrast, some of grievance literature has developed the perspective of divers pathways of protest participation to address the puzzle of resource vs grievance explanation of protest participation (see also Khawaja 1994; Wilkes 2004; della Porta 2014). For instance, Kerbo (1982) distinguishes "movements of affluence" that correspond to the picture of "well-off postmaterialist" developed by standard participation literature and "movement of crisis" that fit to grievance theories. A striking fact is, however, that the different pathways of individual protest participation have not been so far empirically examined in a more systematic way. Vast majority of social movement studies explaining participation in specific movements focuses just one type of protest events and does not study differences across various types of movements (Walgrave and Rucht 2010; McAdam 1986; Oegema and Klandermans 1994; Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009). Only a very few studies focus on the differences among protestors across different types of demonstrations (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). For instance, comparing profiles of protestors at seven demonstrations in Belgium, Norris and her colleagues (2005) show that the composition of protestors differ considerably in regards of age, social class, education and satisfaction with democracy. These results suggest that protestors can also differ in factors that determine their participation according to the particular type of demonstration context. However, a more systematic test of how resources and grievances affect people's participation in different types of protest has not been done.

The goal of the article is to develop further the approach of diverse pathways of protest participation and provide a more advanced empirical test. Following Kerbo, the article will make a theoretical distinction between "movements of affluence" and "movements of crisis" and will determine the two corresponding explanations – resource and grievance – of how people get active in protest. Drawing on the few existing studies, the article will further specify the grievance path of protest participation focusing on various determinants of socio-economic

[2] Survey questions usually used in participation studies collapse all protestors together into one category (regardless the issue of demonstration they participated at) and the analyses study unconditional average effects. Since majority of existing cases of protestors in Western democracies have been the well-off post-materialists, most studies usually find that higher SES increases protest.

deprivation and political radicalism, which is another factor that is expected to play a role in political activation of socio-economically excluded. Regarding the classical "well-off postmaterialist" pathway, the article will emphasize a novel perspective (other than individual resources) on why socio-economic affluence increases protest.

Diverse pathways of protest participation by the type of protest

We can expect that the two types of protests – protest of affluence and protest of crisis – are related to different set of predictors of why people take part in them. According to Kerbo (1982), the main difference between "movements of affluence" and "movements of crisis" is the way how they are related to socio-economic factors. Both of them are posited on two opposite ends of a continuum capturing varying socio-economic conditions. "Protest of affluence" corresponds to the "well-off postmaterialist" theories and explains participation in new social movement's types of protests, such as environmental and civil and minority rights movements that mobilized first in 1960s and are believed to be a result of the post-materialist value change. "Protest of affluence" is, according to Kerbo, usually performed by financially secure people, who get active around moral and conscience issues that are not directly threatening their life.

To test the "well-off postmaterialist" pathway of protest that should correspond to the movements of affluence, this study selects a Gay pride because LGBT rights are an issue usually advocated by new social movements. Tolerance to homosexuality, openness to diversity, carnival and creative style of the collective action presents the exact prototype of post-materialist participation. Gay/Queer/LGBT Prides are organized once a year all over the world and are generally meant to celebrate LGBT lifestyle, publicly express pride of being part of the LGBT community or support for this community. Specifically, Prague Pride march that took place on 17 August 2013 will be studied. The Prague Pride is a traditional annual pride that is organized by small informal group of activists. Ten thousand people participated in the march.

In contrast, "Protests of crisis" should originate from the shortage of socio-economic resources and should be performed by so called beneficiary members, i.e. by people experiencing life-threatening conditions whose improvement became a purpose of their mobilization (Kerbo 1982). As examples of movements of crisis Kerbo and other proponents of grievance theory refer, for instance, to protests done by movements of poor or unemployed in 1930s in the United States. Some scholars suggest that a similar theoretical framework applies to the recent mobilizations related to the economic crisis (della Porta 2014). Della Porta (2014) identifies the new contemporary anti-austerity or Occupy movements as a new wave of protest movements different from the previous main generation of movements – new social movements. In contrast to new social movements that were fighting for recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003), the new wave of contemporary anti-austerity and occupy movements bring "the class and capitalism back" (della Porta 2014). As della Porta suggests, the anti-austerity and Occupy protests are movements of "losers" of neoliberalism standing for people who are not that well off, expressing the voice of poor, excluded and belonging to marginalized groups. It is probably the grievance theory that should explain the best participation at these protests.

To test the "grievance" pathway of protest that should correspond to the movements of crisis, this study will examine determinants of participation at an anti-austerity demonstration. Specifically, demonstration called the End of Godfathers that took place in Prague on 7th April 2013 will be analyzed. It was an anti-corruption and anti-austerity demonstration of around five hundred people sponsored by a populist organization Holešovská výzva.

The following text specifies individual determinants that are distinct for each of the two pathways (well-off postmaterialist and grievance) determining participation in the two types of protest (protest of affluence and protest of crisis). The text focuses only on aspects that should have a different effect according to the two theories and hence are different across the two pathways of protest.

"Well-off post-materialists" pathway in movements of affluence

The explanation of protest participation advocated by mainstream political participation literature interprets protest participation as a continuation of conventional politics (Dalton 2008; Norris 2002; Teorell and Tobiasen 2007; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; van Deth 2011). Studies use more or less the same explanatory factors to account for protest that are used to explain participation at conventional activities such as participation in election campaign or contacting a politician. Next to other factors, like political motivations and mobilization, people should be more likely to politically participate in general and in protests in particular if they have higher socio-economic status, such as being richer or having higher education (Norris 2002, Verba et al. 1995, Dalton 2008a, Armingeon 2007). To test the resource part of the "well-off postmaterialist" pathway of protest participation, the study will test the effect various socio-demographic indicators that are usually used (such as income, education, gender etc.).

To explain the existing social, economic and demographic gap in participation with people of higher socio-economic status participating more, Verba and his colleagues (Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; also Rosenstone and Hansen 2003) developed theory of individual resources: resources such as time, money and skills, are correlated with higher SES and they directly affect participation by decreasing costs of action. In general, the theory claims that well-off people participate more as it does not cost them as much and it is easier for them to participate (thanks to the affluence of resources) than it is for people, who lack resources (i.e. socio-economically deprived). Specifically, the theory for instance explains that more educated people are more likely to protest because they have better cognitive skills to process new political information. Similarly, Rosenstone and Hansen explain the effect of higher income (2003: 11): one does not necessarily need a car to participate at a demonstration; however, when you have one it is much easier to get to the demonstration.

The core mechanism of individual resources as developed by Verba and his colleagues lies in the fact that higher resources increase action directly (i.e. not through other factors, such as attitudes or mobilization) and that this this effect holds "universally" across various types of action (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) and across various contexts (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, 76–77). Taking this theory seriously, a crucial implication is that if SES should affect participation only as an individual capacity to be able to perform the action then people lacking such resources (i.e. socio-economically deprived) should not participate. Hence, if our results will show that there is not a single universal pathway of participation but that also poor socio-economic conditions can activate protest, this result will dispute the well-accepted individual resource mechanism.

Other approaches that are rather neglected by participation literature suggest more contextualized explanation (other than individual capacities to reduce costs of action) of why people with higher socio-economic status participate more. For instance, Nie and his colleagues (1996) show that the reason of why higher education increases particularly non-electoral participation is not because of individual resources. Instead, they show that higher education

(further mediated by occupation and family wealth) increases non-electoral participation via more central positioning in politically relevant networks within society. This perspective corresponds to other research, suggesting that an important part of the link between higher SES and participation might originate from social stratification processes exercised by external environment: e.g. targeted recruitment by political elites of more privileged people (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Maloney 2015).

A slightly different approach to how well-being increases protest is pictured by the proponents of post-materialist theory. This theory provides more contextualized explanation and explains why people with affluent resources decide to devote the resources just to politics and not to other activities. According to this theory, residing in socio-economically rich contexts and experience of affluent socio-economic resources during socialization develops post-materialist values that induce individuals into "elite challenging" protest (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2008; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; Welzel and Deutsch 2012). Post-materialists or people with self-expressive values display lower deference to and increased criticism of political authorities, tolerance of diversity, social trust, higher aspiration for active political involvement particularly in post-materialist issues such as environmental topics and human rights (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Such values should push especially young generations to take part in issue-specific, more direct, creative, spontaneous and alternative lifestyles-oriented types of political participation including protest (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Norris 2002, Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

To test the postmaterialist part of the theory suggesting the pathway of protest participation corresponding to participation in "protests of affluence", the study will focus on factors that indicate the "post-materialist" ethics such as tolerance to diversity, support of others etc. The reason why the study focuses only on "post-materialist ethics" is that just these factors make postmaterialist/self-expressive values special and distinct from other ordinary pro-participatory motivations (such as participatory aspiration like willingness to be active that probably predict all kinds of political action regardless of post-materialism).

Grievance pathway in movements of crisis

Grievance explanation of protest participation originates from a very different perspective on protest than suggested by the "well-off postmaterialist" explanation. Drawing on classical literature, this approach perceives protest as an alternative tool to conventional politics, which is used by various excluded groups, such as unprivileged poor people, ethnic minorities or extremists, who, from various reasons, cannot use the conventional strategies (Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978; Snow and Soule 2009; Buechler 2004).

In contrast to "well-off postmaterialist" theory, the grievance literature does not suggest that higher socio-economic status contributes to more protest, just the contrary. It should be people from lower strata of the society who are not that well off who will be more likely to protest. Since it is only privileged, whose demands are reflected by politicians, unprivileged are more likely to protest then privileged because they don't have any other option how they can successfully communicate their grievances. Contrary to the argument of individual resources, these people protest not because they can afford it but because they do not have anything to lose and do not have any other option. Unlike "well-off postmaterilists" that get active around postmaterialist moral or conscience issues, participants of "protest of crisis" mobilize around the bad socio-economic conditions that become a trigger of political action. Based on this we expect

that people, who are socio-economically deprived (lower income, lower education, unemployed), are more likely to protest in this type of demonstration.

Particularly classical collective behavior literature (Parkin 1968; Gurr 1970; Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Turner and Killian 1987; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005) emphasized next to socio-economic hardship also radicalism as a trigger of participation in "protest of crisis." This literature pictures protestors as "anti-state rebels," who are extremists, violent radicals that threaten the basic principles of democracy and conventional politics. Hence we can expect that protestors of crisis should be driven by extreme dissatisfaction with politics and have extremist political preferences.

Table 1 provides a summary of predictions derived from the two theories. As we can see, for some variables the two theories provide opposite predictions, such as negative and positive effect of income. For some variables one of the theories does not provide any specific prediction. In general, the important point here is that if the general notion of diverse pathways of protest participation according to the type of demonstration is correct, then we should observe two types of results. Firstly, predictors falling under one explanation should explain participation in a protest corresponding to this type or protest. Second, predictors falling under one explanation should not explain participation in a protest that does not correspond to this type of protest. For instance, participation at the End of the Godfathers protest should not be a result of postmaterilist ethics, as suggested by the "well-off postmaterialist" theory, because according to the grievance theory, there is no reason to expect grievanced protestors to be driven by these values. Similarly in the case of the Prague Pride, we should not find effect of political extremism.

– Table 1 –

Design and data

The examination of diverse pathways of protest requires a novel approach as traditionally used methods cannot be used. The greatest challenge for the study of individual participation in protest is that protest in general is a rare phenomenon when approached by traditionally used method of one-shot single-country nationally representative surveys (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; van Deth, Montero, and Westholm 2007). As protestors establish only a tiny fraction of the population (on average 5 percent of people declare participation in the last year) they are therefore hardly covered by national random samples (usually not more than 50 cases). Given that we are interested in differences across protestors in terms of what type of demonstration they attended, the absolute numbers of cases representing the diverse protests would be a few cases only.

Other approaches that have been used mainly by studies in social movements are not efficient either. Some studies examine only protestors at different demonstration in "no-variance" designs that lack information on people, who did not protest (della Porta 2014; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Such studies cannot be used to make inference about causes of participation (specifically to disentangle alternative explanations) because they lack the control/negative cases (Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015). Other studies examine protest among various sub-populations that have a high concentration of protestors, such as homeless protestors within homeless communities that experienced protest waves (Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009) or participants at risky activism among those who applied for being included in this activism program (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). However, the problem with such designs is that they suffer from a selection bias on explanatory variables. For instance,

by studying only homeless the study biases the sample not only on the key explanatory variable (socio-economic hardship) but also on other important factors that correlate with this restriction (as socio-economic hardship correlates with other predictors of protest).

The paper uses a novel research strategy of case-control design combined with protest surveying to solve this issue (Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015). Case-control studies are often used in epidemiology and are a very efficient way of how to target rare phenomena and build a variation design that enables valid causal inference (King and Zeng 2001; Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015; Lacy 1997). It lies in the selection on the depend variable that proceeds in two independent steps (sampling from a population of rare cases and sampling from the population of controls), which assures that the final design is not biased on potential explanatory variables. Specifically, the design used in this study combines three datasets. Survey of protestors at two different demonstrations mentioned above: Prague Pride 2013 (protest of affluence) and the End of Godfathers demonstration (protest of crisis). The two protest events represent extreme cases on the Kerbo's dimension of how socio-economic conditions affect movements. The data gathering was done within the Czech part of the international research project "Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation" (CCC) and followed fully the methodology of the project (van Stekelenburg et al. 2012). The surveys employed a procedure that approximates random sampling methodology in the crowds larger than 1000 of protestors and a distribution of questionnaires to approximately 1000 protestors[3] (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). The core questionnaire of the CCC project was used and in addition included also several questions that were asked only in the Czech wave of this research.

The third component of the case-control design are data on controls representing the general Czech population of people, who did not participate in the two protests. Specifically, the Czech wave if the International Social Survey Programm 2014 Citizenship module is used. The survey was fielded approximately a year after the two protest surveys and includes a question on participation at the demonstration in the last 12 months that allows us to detect potential positive cases (i.e. people who might have taken part in the two demonstrations). Both, the Czech CCC and ISSP Citizenship questionnaires were designed in a way to get as much of overlap between the two surveys as possible. Hence all used measures have exactly the same measurement (the same wording survey questions and answer categories).

Dependent variables

The two dependent variables indicate participation in the two protests. The first one indicates participation at Prague Pride where participation = 1, ISSP respondents who did not take part at the demonstration in last 12 months = 0. The second variable indicates participation in the End of Godfathers protest. Participation in this protest = 1, ISSP respondents = 0.

Independent variables

Education is indicated by 11 categories of finished education ordered from the lowest to the highest education. Unemployment is measured with 1 for people being unemployed and 0 for others. Being a student also taps increased individual resources (mainly free time), the variable is measured as 1 for students and 0 for others. Gender is coded as 1 for women and 0 for men.

The analysis uses two measures of wealth. The first measure indicates a difference between poor people (having family income below country average) and rich people. The second

[3] Since the turnout at the End of Godfathers demonstration was only approximately 500 people, the questionnaires were distributed to all participants.

measure taps closer the individual resources mechanism that predicts that the more money people have the more they can decrease the costs of participation. It is a quantitative measure of family income measured by 15 categories of different income levels.

To tap political radicalism two measures are used. First, the indicator of being extremist leftist is recoded from the question measuring self-placement on the left right scale (from 0 to 10) with value 0 being recoded as 1 – extreme left and other values being recoded as 0. Second, the extreme dissatisfaction with how democracy works is constructed in the same way. The original measure on the scale from 0 to 10 was recoded as original 0 to 1 – extreme political dissatisfaction and 0 for all others.

To measure post-materialist ethics a revised version of Dalton's norms of engaged citizenship measure that can be used as a proxy of postmaterialism is used (Dalton 2008). Specifically, variables that tap the post-materialist ethics are used: "try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions", "choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more", and "help people in the rest of the world who are worse off." The PCA analysis of these items run on the pooled sample and all three samples separately derived one factor and the scale has a high reliability (factor loadings for the pooled data: understand other opinions = .723, choose products = .734, help people = .767, Cronbach's Alpha = .582). Variables that indicate general pro-participatory values (such as "a good citizen should keep watch on the actions of government" or "a good citizen should be active in social or political associations") are left out as they indicate a general tendency to participate that is very close to actual participation and would understandably probably predict all kinds of political action.

Results

Table 1 presents the results from six logistic regressions testing the two theories (individual resources and grievances) on the two dependent variables indicating participation in the two different types of protest (protest of affluence and protest of crisis versus people who did not participate representing the general participation). Models I and II include only socio-demographic variables. Model I includes income as a dummy variable distinguishing rich and poor people that captures the expectation of a grievance theory. Model II includes income as a scale measure reflecting the suggestion of individual resources. Models III expand the Models I and II by adding attitudinal variables expected by the individual theories. The reason for these two steps is that the effect of the SES variables can be mediated by the attitudes.

Model I in the case of protest of crisis supports the expectations for the effect of unemployment and being poor: people who are unemployed and people whose family income is below national average are more likely to take part in the End of the Godfathers demonstration that represents a protest of crisis. These results support the grievance theory and dispute the "universalist" interpretation of the individual resource theory suggesting that individual capacity to participate is necessary for participation. Also in line with our expectations, being a student, which probably indicates time resources, does not increase participation in this protest. The only result that goes against our theoretical expectations is the positive effect of education. In contrast to our expectation of a negative effect, more educated people are more likely to take part in the protest of crisis.

Model II differs from Model I in the variable indicating income. Here income is included as a quantitative variable, which corresponds to individual resource explanation. In line with our expectation, this variable does not have a positive effect on the likelihood of participation in the

protest of crisis. Simultaneously, the quantitative version of income does not also have a dampening effect on participation in the End of Godfathers. All other variables in the Model II show the same effect as in the Model I.

The third and fourth column (Model I and II) show results on the effect of socio-demographic variables on participation in the protest of affluence. All results are fully in line with our expectations derived from the individual resources theory: people with higher income (measured as a scale), more educated and students are more likely to take part in Prague Pride. Variables specific to the grievance explanation – unemployment and poor vs rich do not affect participation in the protest of affluence.

The right part of the Table 2 shows results on models III that expand the previous models with political motivations. The expectation for the grievance pathway of protest was that political radicalism should determine people's participation in protest of crisis (but not in protest of affluence). This expectation is corroborated by the findings: people identifying themselves as extreme left or indicating extreme dissatisfaction with democracy are more likely to take part at the End of Godfathers demonstration. Simultaneously, postmaterialist ethics does not play any significant role for participation at the protest of crisis, which is in line with our expectations.

The expectation for the effect of political motivations on participation at protest of affluence was exactly the opposite. It should be primarily people having postmaterialist ethics, such as environmental values, respect to others, feeling obligation to help people from all over the world, who should be more likely to participate in the Prague Pride. The results support this expectation: higher postmaterialist ethics leads to higher likelihood of participation at the protest of affluence. In line with our expectations suggesting that radicalism is a pathway for protest of crisis but not for protest of affluence, the results show that there is no significant effect of leftist extremism and extreme political dissatisfaction on participation at the Prague Pride.

Table 2 shows models comparing passive people with people active in the two types of protests. These models, in general, answer the question of why people participate in the specific type of protest. However, are the two pathways different from one another? Additional analyses that test if the effect of the individual variables is different between the two protests generally support this suggestion. All variables of our research interest (including education) compared between Models I and then Models II have significantly different effect on the two types of protest participation. The only exception is unemployment that does not reach statistical significance (probably due to lower number of cases). Comparisons of the effect of political motivations in Models III show support only for extreme dissatisfaction with democracy. For postmateriaslit ethics and leftist extremism we lack statistical leverage to say that the effects of the two variables is different between the two models.

– Table 2 –

Discussion and Conclusion

The recent extensive mobilization of anti-austerity demonstrations and Occupy movements brings attention to the fact that probably there are different pathways of protest participation. While participation at, until recently predominant, "new social movements" is facilitated by higher socio-economic resources and postmaterialist values, the new wave of anti-austerity and Occupy movements suggests that also the lack of socio-economic resources might trigger protest. This article focused on the examination of diverse pathways of protest participation testing two different theories (classical political participation theory of well-off postmaterialists

and grievance theory) on participation in two different types of protest – protest of affluence and protest of crisis).

There are three important results. First, the findings suggest that there really are different pathways that lead people to protest. Both types of protests are explained by a different set of variables: influences of individual predictors are in line with the particular theories and variables predicted by the rival theory do not have an influence on protest that does not correspond to this explanation. Specifically, factors predicted by the well-off postmaterialist theory (higher income, being a student, higher education, postmaterialist values) increase participation at the Prague Pride (protest of affluence) but they do not show any effect on participation at the End of Godfathers march representing the protest of crisis (with the exception of education). Simultaneously, factors predicted by the grievance theory (being poor compared to rich, being unemployed, having extreme leftist ideology and extreme dissatisfaction with politics) increase participation at the protest of crisis but do not have any effect on participation at the Prague Pride.

Second, the effect of higher education is different as it increases participation in both types of protest. This finding goes against the grievance theory and is not in line with results on other determinants in the model explaining protest in crisis. In contrast, this finding supports the conventional participation theory suggesting that people need resources, in this case particularly skills and intellectual capacity, that decrease costs of action, to get involved in political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). However, also other mechanisms might be at play. A detailed examination of mechanisms how higher socio-economic status increases participation has shown that particularly education does not need to function as a proxy for an accumulation of more participatory skills but affects participation by increasing political interest (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). If this mechanism is correct this means that next to experiencing a mobilizing grievance (being unemployed and poor) people need to be interested in politics to get active in protest of crisis. Other already mentioned explanation of why education increases participation is emphasized by Nie and his colleagues (1996). They show that education supports participation via more central positioning in politically relevant networks within society. Hence this suggests that while people participate in protest because of socio-economic deprivation and exclusion, they still might be embedded in mobilizing networks that recruit them into political action (such as trade union membership). This interpretation would be in line with literature on participation of minorities that shows that mobilization is crucial for participation of socio-economically excluded people. Mobilizing actors take over the costs of participation on their side and hence enable participation of socio-economically deprived people, who lack individual resources to participate (Uhlaner 1989; Leighley 2001)

Third, the results show how differently SES affects participation. If socio-economic status is measured by factors like higher income, being a student, and having more education that indicate higher accumulation of resources (money, time and skills), they increase participation at the protest of affluence (Prague Pride). If socio-economic status is measured by variables that indicate socio-economically privileged position (being rich compared to poor or being employed), it does not increase participation at the Prague Pride.

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Table 1: Summary of predictions for the "well-of postmaterialist" and "grievance" pathways of protest participation

	Grievance theory – protest of crisis The End of Godfathers	**Well-off postmaterialist – protest of affluence** Prague Pride
Socio-demographic variables		
Education	Negative effect	Positive effect
Income	Negative effect	Positive effect
Unemployment	Positive effect	-
Student	-	Positive effect
Attitudinal variables		
Extreme leftists	Positive effect	-
Extreme political dissatisfaction	Positive effect	-
Postmaterialist ethics	-	Positive effect

Table 2: Grievance and well-off postmaterialist pathways of protest

	Socio-economic Status				Motivations	
	Protest of crisis		Protest of affluence		Protest of crisis	Protest of affluence
	M I	M II	M I	M II	M III	M III
SES variables						
Education	.259*** (.031)	.255*** (.033)	. 377*** (.042)	.325*** (.045)	.310*** (.036)	.329*** (.045)
Student	.023 (.523)	.284 (.559)	2.134*** (.255)	2.456*** (.414)	.239 (.582)	2.531*** (.322)
Income – scale measure		-.033 (.025)		.090** (.030)		.096** (.032)
Income – below average	.780*** (.183)		.253 (.204)		.681** (.202)	
Unemployed	1.110*** (.523)	1.086*** (.343)	.483 (.494)	.876 (.521)	.951** (.358)	.998 (.530)
Age	.019** (.006)	.019** (.006)	.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.019** (.006)	-.001** (.001)
Woman	.678*** (.170)	.798*** (.181)	.507* (.206)	.603** (.227)	.816*** (.193)	.563* (.229)
Attitudes						
Extreme leftist					1.158*** (.327)	.409 (.656)
Extreme political dissatisfaction					2.412*** (.214)	.222 (.494)
Post-materialist ethics					.158 (.169)	.578** (.219)
Pseudo R2	0.11	0.10	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.21
BIC	1133.094	1005.236	788.4799	641.8872	938.6565	651.1835
Log-likelihood	-540.46549	-477.47189	-368.29318	-295.99387	-432.25537	-290.07104
N	1723	1319	1658	1247	1660	1217

Note:
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001, standard errors in parentheses.