Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Kateřina Vráblíková

Research Fellowship, 2016-2018 VR 123/1-1

Mershon Center for International Security Studies

The Ohio State University

Protest, Hardship, and Democracy (PHD) / Protest, sozio-ökonomische Not, und Demokratie

---

Project Description

1 Current state of research

1.1 Introduction

Most Western democracies have recently experienced remarkable mobilizations related to the economic crisis and growing socio-economic inequality, such as anti-austerity protests and Occupy movements. Protests of socio-economically deprived people, such as peasants' or poor people's movements (Piven and Cloward 1977; Jenkins and Perrow 1977), have appeared in the past; however, these mobilizations were rather sporadic. The novel aspect of recent developments is that protest under socio-economic hardship has become a remarkable political force in contemporary democracies (della Porta 2014; Grasso and Giugni 2015). Anti-austerity protests and Occupy movements challenge the status quo and aim at a radical renewal of democracy. Given the long-term trend of deepening wealth inequality in contemporary democracies (OECD 2011), we can expect political mobilization stemming from socio-economic hardships to increase in coming years (della Porta 2014).

What does the recent growth of protest under socio-economic hardship mean for contemporary representative democracies? Ordinarily protest has usually been a matter of affluent socio-economic resources with people of higher socio-economic status residing in wealthier countries protesting substantially more (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Schussman and Soule 2005; Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Teorell and Tobiasen 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 190). Research has mainly focused just on this "well-off" type of activism and mostly disregarded other kinds of protest. As a result, we know a lot about the "well-off" protestors: who they are, what message they communicate to the political system, what factors causes this type of activism and what pros and cons it has for democratic politics. However, this knowledge probably does not apply to participants of protest under socio-economic hardship. Anti-austerity protests or generally activism of socio-economically deprived groups like the poor or immigrants signify a different type of political activism that is distinct from protest we have seen so far in Western democracies (della Porta 2014). In contrast to traditional "well-off" protest, protest under economic hardship is performed by socio-economically deprived people and appears in the context of economic deterioration. Available evidence shows that it was mostly well-educated but unemployed or underemployed young people with insecure jobs that took part in anti-austerity demonstrations reacting to the consequences of the economic crisis (della Porta 2014; but see Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). On some occasions also older and poorer people became politically active to protest economic hardship and political exclusion.[1]

---

[1] For instance, 10 per cent of participants at the anti-austerity demonstration organized in Prague (7th April 2013) were unemployed and a large majority of them came from very poor households far below the country's median income levels (Vráblíková 2015).

Is the character of political activism of socio-economically deprived people different from protest of their better-off counterparts? What are democratic values and political preferences of protestors under socio-economic hardship? Is their political involvement limited to collective actions or do socio-economically deprived participants also express themselves in electoral arena? Why do people participate in this kind of protest? Under what conditions does the lack of socio-economic resources trigger protest?

1.2 Protestors under Hardship and their Democratic Input

From the perspective of political equality, the increased participation of socio-economically deprived people might be beneficial. Since political participation was so far rather a domain of the more privileged, the large underrepresentation of people with a lower socio-economic status is one of the biggest threats to democratic politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Teorell and Tobiasen 2007). Increased participation of excluded people hence might signify a way to decrease existing political inequalities as it communicates political voices of socio-economically disadvantaged people.

However, looking from another perspective, increased activism of socio-economically excluded people might bring new challenges as it is unclear what message these voices communicate. The "well-off" protestors tend to be "critical democrats": more demanding and critical about politicians, show higher tolerance for diversity, support democratic principles, have greater social trust and higher solidarity than other people (Dalton 2008; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Teorell and Tobiasen 2007; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; Norris 1999). However, does the same apply to protest under socio-economic hardship? Though some suggest that anti-austerity and occupy protestors also promote norms of inclusive citizenship and solidarity (della Porta 2014), none of the available studies of socio-economically deprived protestors has really examined their democratic norms and political preferences. Importantly, socio-economically deprived protestors might have different norms and values than the so far prevalent "well-off" protestors. Classical grievance literature pictures socio-economically deprived protestors as angry anti-democratic radicals (Parkin 1968; Gurr 1970; Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Besides, other literature also suggests a pessimistic view as socio-economically marginalized people in general show significantly lower support for democratic principles, lower support for pro-social norms and lower political tolerance (Letki 2006; Schwadel and Garneau 2014; Schäfer 2010). Similarly, being threatened by events like economic crises or terrorist attacks, activates ethnocentrism and fears that lead to close-mindedness and intolerance (Huddy et al. 2002; Kam and Kinder 2007). In any case, the question which democratic values and political preferences socio-economically deprived protestors bring to democratic politics via their participation remains empirically still open.

1.3 Sources of Protest under Hardship

Similarly, not much is known about the origins of protest under socio-economic hardship. How does socio-economic hardship induce people to get involved in protest? Under what conditions does the lack of socio-economic resources trigger protest (instead of dampening it as in the case of "well-off" protest)? The conventional literature has provided well-developed explanations of the "well-off" type of protest. For instance, next to influence of political motivations and mobilization, the classical Civic Voluntarism Model explains mainly the positive effect of higher socio-economic status (SES) on individual participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Similarly, resource mobilization theory prevalent in social movement literature has emphasized the role of affluent collective resources in mobilization of people (Edwards and McCarthy 2004).[2] Also proponents of post-materialist theory have shown that residence in more socio-economically advanced

[2] Unlike political participation literature, resource mobilization theory does not claim that individual affluence of resources is needed; rather, it suggests that organizational resources at the level of groups induce protest. However, mainstream social movement literature explicitly predicts zero effect of socio-economic hardship on protest and does not usually even take into account socio-economic hardship in empirical studies of protest (Snow and Soule 2009, 42–51; Buechler 2004, 51–53).

contexts and experience of affluent socio-economic resources during socialization develop post-materialist values that induce individuals into “elite challenging” protest (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Welzel and Deutsch 2012).

Although these theories explain the “well-off” type of protest very well, they cannot fully account for protest under socio-economic hardship. The pure existence of anti-austerity protests or protest of socio-economically deprived people in general seems to contravene some of these classical theories because these theories expect primarily the affluent to protest. Probably, the effect of socio-economic resources on participation is hence more complex, i.e. not homogenously and unconditionally positive as suggested by conventional theories explaining primarily the “well-off” participants. To be sure, theories predicting positive effect of affluence on activism are probably still valid for most of the existing cases of protestors and picture an important mechanism of how socio-economic factors affect participation (Kerbo 1982; Wilkes 2004). However, there are rare and exceptional conditions under which a deteriorating socio-economic situation does not inhibit activism (as suggested by standard literature), but stimulates political action. The crucial question that has been basically left untouched is what these conditions are and how these processes function.

Grievance theories have recognized that not all protests are driven by socio-economic resources, but instead by the lack of resources. For instance Kerbo (1982) suggests that next to “movements of affluence” that correspond to the classical “well-off postmaterialist” protest, there are also “movements of crisis” characterized by poor socioeconomic conditions (see also Khawaja 1994; Wilkes 2004; della Porta 2014). Grievance theories suggest that “protests of crisis”, such as protest of poor and unemployed people, is caused by a deprived socio-economic situation that becomes a mobilizing grievance and triggers political action (Buechler 1999; Snow and Soule 2009, 24).

Grievance approaches have not explained yet in more detail why and under what conditions socio-economic hardship triggers protest (and does not inhibit it as in the case of “well-off” type of activism). Since the classical studies of collective behavior (Gurr 1970; Piven and Cloward 1977; Turner and Killian 1987; Smelser 1962) and after initial mixed or unsupportive results, grievance theories have been heavily neglected in both, political participation and social movement literature (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Though some studies kept developing the grievance approach, they mostly do not focus on individual participation in protest. Most of grievance studies analyze the effect of socio-economic hardship on timing and the amount of protest events at the aggregate level and do not examine why socio-economically deprived people protest (Jenkins, Maher, and Fahrer 2014; Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Richards and Gelleny 2006; Wilkes 2004; but see Opp 2000; Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). Besides, they mostly focus on radical forms of political actions like riots or rebellions but have not examined the role of socio-economic hardship for non-violent protest (Jenkins, Maher, and Fahrer 2014; Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Richards and Gelleny 2006; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). However, as some point out, rebellions are not the type of outcome that is expected to be produced by socio-economic hardship in democratic regimes (Wilkes 2004; Gurr 1993; Opp 2000). According to Gurr (1993) rebellions and riots are too costly and less necessary in democracies when more peaceful options of legal protest are available.

Recently, grievance theories have been revived in social movement literature to explain why individuals take part in non-violent protest (della Porta 2014; Snow and Soule 2009). But these studies are mostly theoretical (Snow et al. 1998; Snow and Soule 2009) and have not really systematically tested the grievance explanation in more advanced designs that would disentangle the role of socio-economic hardship from alternative explanations (della Porta 2014; Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009; but see Opp 2000; Rüdig and Karyotis 2014).

More attention has been paid to the impact of grievances on individual political activism in social psychology (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008; Mummendey et al. 1999). This literature emphasizes that socio-economic hardship needs to be perceived as mobilizing collective grievance by potential participants and not as a personal problem in order to induce protest (Snow and Soule 2009; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008; Abrams and Grant 2012; Kawakami and Dion 1995).

Interpretative strategies (frame alignment) (Benford and Snow 2000) and comparisons with situation of other people/social groups (relative deprivation) help individuals perceive their problem as collective, unjust and corrigible. These processes induce feelings of dissatisfaction, frustration and anger and motivate people to protest. Although perceptions of reality are undoubtedly crucial for behavior and can work as mediating factors, the important question is how such interpretations are related to factual socio-economic situations (Opp 2000). The majority of socio-psychological studies does not examine factual disadvantages originating in socio-economic structure but study people's perceptions only (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Hence, the question that is left unanswered by this literature is the role of structural socio-economic conditions in the activation of the individual psychological processes described.

Some of the classical collective behavior literature suggests that the conditions that might activate the socio-economic hardship to produce protest are macro-level processes such as crises, socio-structural strains, breakdowns, threats or a disruption of normal social routines (Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 2010; Marx and Engels 2014; Piven and Cloward 1977; Smelser 1962; Buechler 2004). For instance, strain theories suggest that macro-level structural changes (political, economic and demographic shifts resulting from wars or restructuring economic institutions) trigger protest of people, whose position is threatened and who experience serious losses because of such changes (Buechler 2004; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). Also, Snow's et al.'s theory of "quotidian disruption", which draws on the classical breakdown theory, suggests that events, such as natural disasters or economic crises, induce people hit by these events into protest by disrupting their everyday routine (quotidian) and taken-for-granted life (Snow et al. 1998).

While often theoretically disregarded and hardly empirically studied, a crucial implication of all these theories is that for socio-economic hardship to induce protest, both particular individual and structural factors need to be integrated. Specifically, the interaction of a large scale or disruptive macro-level structural change on one hand and the experience of individual-level hardship on the other hand seem to be the special conditions that activate protest under hardship. Recently studies analyzing the political consequences of the economic crisis that emerged in 2008 have revived this line of thoughts. Many agree that the economic crisis had profound effects on protest politics (Beissinger and Sasse 2014; della Porta 2014; Grasso and Giugni 2015; Kriesi 2014). However, these studies have not focused on the interaction between macro-structural and individual socio-economic conditions in more detail. They either examine aggregate level protest and do not focus on individual level protest and personal hardship (Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Kriesi 2014; Grasso and Giugni 2015) or they do not examine more systematically how the variation in macro-structural conditions triggers socio-economically deprived individuals to protest (della Porta 2014; Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). Only a recent study by Kern and her colleagues (2015) has tested the effect of contextual and individual-level socio-economic hardship on individual protest in a more systematic multi-level setting. Their results suggest initial support for the theory expecting a combined effect of macro-structural and individual hardship: unlike in previous times, people's discontent with the economy and unemployment enhances individual protest after 2008. Still, a more elaborated theory that would specify exactly how and why the interaction between macro-structural and individual-level socio-economic hardship induces protest and a more developed analysis of these effects are lacking.

2 Research objective and preliminary work

The goal of the project is to study participation in protest under socio-economic hardship. The principle research questions are: 1) *How does the combined effect of macro-structural and individual-level socio-economic hardship affect individual protest?* 2) *Which democratic values and political preferences are brought into politics by socio-economically deprived protestors?* The project has four research objectives to answer the two research questions:

1. To develop an explanatory theory specifying the macro-structural and individual-level conditions under which socio-economic hardship induces protest.

2. To theoretically elaborate the question of socio-economic equality in politics and political representation of divers democratic norms and political preferences under socio-economic hardship.

3. To empirically examine theoretical explanations by applying mixed methods:

   3.1. Qualitative analysis of eight country socio-economic contexts combined with individual-level quantitative analyses of existing case-control surveys of protestors to further develop the multi-level explanatory theory.

   3.2. Statistical test of the combined effect of macro-structural and individual-level socio-economic hardship on individual protest using existing repeated cross-country surveys of individuals (primary focus on macro-level effects).

   3.3. Carrying out two new case-control protestors' surveys in two different socio-economic country contexts to test in more detail the individual-level effects.

   3.4. Examination of democratic values and political preferences of socio-economically deprived protestors compared to other (well-off) protestors and the general population.

4. To provide an empirically based contribution to the discussions on the prospects of representative democracy under hardship.

The preliminary work on the project has been done during the last year as a part of my research at the University of Mannheim (UMA): 1) In the initial phase the work focused mainly on theory development based on a comprehensive review of social movement, political economy, social psychology, and risk management literature relevant for protest under socio-economic hardship. This overview will be used to develop a general theory combing macro-structural and individual socio-economic hardship to explain how protest is induced (objective 1). 2) Extensive preliminary analyses of existing protest survey data has been conducted. The protest survey data have been collected in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology, The Czech Academy of Sciences (2013-2014) and in the cooperation with other teams taking part at the "Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation" (CCC, 2008-2013, see Stekelenburg et al. 2012). In the last year I recoded and preliminary analyzed the protest survey data (Vráblíková 2015) to examine the individual determinants of "well-of" and "hardship" types of protest (objective 3.1.). Besides, I have done a preliminary examination of individual-level socio-economic hardship effects on protest and voting in comparative survey data (Vráblíková and Linek 2015). 3) An innovative methodological approach has been developed to advance existing methods to enable more efficient examinations of protest under socio-economic hardship that have a rare character and are hard to study (see below). Specifically, this new research strategy combines a case-control design with protest survey approach to enable valid inference on causes of participation in protest under socio-economic hardship (Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015).

The findings of the project proposed will be relevant beyond academic literature and will provide expertise to existing programs and projects run by various foundations, governments or European commission aimed at supporting civic and political engagement and the political inclusion of disadvantaged groups as a means through which to address economic inequalities and social exclusion (e.g. EC 2014).

3 Project-related publications

3.1 Articles which have been published by publication outlets with scientific quality assurance; book publications; and works which have been accepted for publication but not yet published.

Vráblíková, Kateřina. 2014. "How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures, and Nonelectoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (2): 203–29, 2014 IF 2.0, # 12 in Political Science, 15 citations on Google Scholar.

Vráblíková, Kateřina, and Ondřej Císař. 2014. "Individual Political Participation and Macro Contextual Determinants." In *Political and Civic Engagement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by Martyn Barrett and Bruna Zani, 33–53. Sussex: Routledge.

Vráblíková, Kateřina. 2016. *What Kind of Democracy? Participation, Inclusiveness and Contestation*. Book manuscript accepted for publication by Routledge in 2016.

3.2 Other publications

Vráblíková, Kateřina. 2015. "Privileged Post-Materialists or Excluded Radicals? Different Pathways of Protest Participation in a Case-Control Study." *Paper Presented at the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main, May 26, 2015*.

Vráblíková, Kateřina, and Lukáš Linek. 2015. "Explaining the Composition of an Individual's Political Repertoire: Voting and Protesting." *Paper Prepared for the 2015 MPSA Conference Chicago, April 16 - 19, 2015*.

Vráblíková, Kateřina, and Richard Traunmüller. 2015. "Zero the Hero: Upgrading Targeted Surveys to Case-Control Designs." *Paper Prepared for the 2015 ECPR Conference Montreal, August 26 - 29, 2015*.

4 Research plan, including proposed research methods

The project focuses on individual participation in non-violent protest since it is the most-likely repertoire used in democracies as this channel of political expression is broadly available and relatively low-cost for all citizens (compared to violent radical actions) (Gurr 1993).[3] In addition, it will also examine how individuals combine protest with other political activities (mainly voting) in their individual action repertoire (Vráblíková and Linek 2015).

4.1 First research question: *How does the combined effect of macro-structural and individual-level socio-economic hardship affect individual protest?*

To develop a theoretical answer to this question (Month 1-3; see time table below) the project will: 1) draw on the classical literature on collective behavior, grievance and political participation, 2) incorporate insights from other fields that study the effect of socio-economic hardship on political outcomes (economic voting, comparative political economy, social psychology, risk management literature), and 3) use results from exploratory analyses (see below, objective 3.1.).

4.1.1 Multilevel Theory of Socio-Economic Hardship and Protest

In general, the project theorizes about two main mechanisms of why the interaction of macro-structural and individual socio-economic deterioration should trigger participation in protest (Buechler 2004; Piven and Cloward 1977). First, the most often implied mechanism is that macro-structural changes, such as an economic crisis or a significant restructuring of existing economic arrangements, considerably alter material conditions of a large group of people. From this perspective, macro-structural socio-economic developments help constitute specific socio-structurally based constituencies that could potentially protest.

Second, a theoretically more innovative and important reason of why macro-structural socio-economic deterioration should lead to protest of socio-economically deprived people is its effect on political processes. In summary, macro-structural socio-economic changes facilitate politicization of socio-economic problems and help mobilize potential participants. Public policy, social movement and risk management literature all agree that events that might have catastrophic or fatal consequences for a large number of people and are little predictable and unfamiliar, such as economic crisis or a nuclear accident, ripple the existing socio-political structures and disrupt familiar societal routines (Slovic 1987; Buechler 2004; Piven and Cloward 1977; Boin, Hart, and McConnell 2009; Keeler 1993). The important point is that such macro-structural changes do not only disrupt the quotidian of people personally affected by the crises as suggested by Snow et al. (1998), but that they also severely disrupt a "quotidian" of national politics. The stress that the political system experiences makes the macro-structural change extremely politically salient and results in an unprecedented opening of the political space for various political actors and a radical redefinition of political issues and identities

[3] Illegal/violent protest is almost non-existent in contemporary democracies. In most countries (with the exception of Spain and Greece), the collective actions responding to the economic crisis were also non-violent and peaceful demonstrations.

(Buechler 2004; Piven and Cloward 1977; Boin, Hart, and McConnell 2009; Keeler 1993). This process of politicization is a crucial moment that triggers the mechanisms (well-described by social psychology literature reviewed above) that transform individual socio-economic hardship into collectively perceived mobilizing grievances that then empower socio-economically deprived people into action. Hence the disruption of the political quotidian that opens the political space at the societal level provides the necessary theoretical link between macro-structural socio-economic and individual/social-group level processes leading to protest of economically deprived people/groups.

The project theorizes that, on the one hand, this empowerment takes place indirectly through a general politicization of socio-economic change. Some students of identity politics point out that the necessary cultural component of materially determined socio-economic statuses is to a large extent externally imposed by the state and general socio-political environments (Bernstein 2005). Next to the positioning of specific people in socio-economically vulnerable positions, macro-structural socio-economic changes simultaneously create (thanks to their politicization in the media and general political discourses) a politically salient category of the "poor" or the "precariat." For instance, Monroe (1995) shows this process in his study of how a collapse of existing political structures in former Yugoslavia contributed to politicization of ethnic identities and then led to inter-ethnic political violence.

On the other hand, the politicization of socio-economically disadvantaged identities takes place through direct mobilization of deprived constituencies by political actors. In contrast to original collective behavior literature that pictured activism of deprived people as spontaneous and unstructured, recent studies on activism of socio-economically excluded people show that mobilization, social networks and cohesion, and collective identity might play an important role (Useem 1980, 366; Shefner 1999; Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009; Snow and Soule 2009; Snow et al. 1998). Though actually hardly empirically examined in studies on individual political participation in general, many agree that mobilization is crucial (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 5; Norris 2002; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Klandermans 1984; Abramson and Claggett 2001). Mobilizing actors make use of the fact that there is a politically recognized constituency of socio-economically deprived (open discursive opportunity structure, Koopmans and Statham 1999). Mobilizing actors get involved in consensus mobilization that, using discursive framing described by social-psychology literature, helps transform salient socio-economic grievances into political consciousness among the constituency of potential participants and interpret their issue as unjust and changeable (Oegema and Klandermans 1994; Benford and Snow 2000). Mobilizing actors also directly recruit potential participants to take part in specific participatory events (action mobilization) (Oegema and Klandermans 1994). A crucial moment here is that the recruitment is not random but targeted to specific types of people (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Though usually privileged people are more likely to be targeted, in this situation these are the socio-economically deprived people, who become the constituency targeted by mobilization. In this way mobilizing actors take over the costs of participation on their side and hence enable participation of socio-economically deprived people, who lack individual resources to participate (Uhlaner 1989; Leighley 2001).

Importantly, the inclusion of mobilization into our theoretical framework does not mean that political activism is at the end of the day mainly about affluence of (mobilization) resources. In line with some other authors, the project sees socio-economic hardship and particularly collective resources as complementary (Kerbo 1982; Khawaja 1994; Wilkes 2004). However, unlike standard literature, theoretical expectations developed in this project suggest that the initial trigger is structural and originates from socio-economic scarcity and deprivation. In other words, in contrast to the conventional literature, the project suggests that socio-economic hardship matters for participation in protest. Since it has not been empirically examined so far, the interplay between rarely studied factors – socio-economic hardships and recruitment – and other more known intervening factors like emotions (anger and fear) reviewed above; this project will focus on this lacuna in contemporary research.

To sum up, the general theoretical expectation that will be studied by the project is that the two – individual and structural-level socio-economic hardship – will amplify each other's

effect and lead to individual protest. The mechanisms of these effects are 1) existence of socio-economically deprived constituency and 2) politicization (political saliency and mobilization).

4.1.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization of Socio-Economic Hardship

The study will determine specific indicators of socio-economic hardship that should have the suggested mobilizing effect, will collect secondary and primary data and empirically examine them. In general, the project specifies four most important aspects of the structural and individual dimensions of socio-economic deterioration that should induce protest (mainly Opp 2000; also Buechler 2004; Snow and Soule 2009; Kawakami and Dion 1995): 1. Overtime decline/loss, 2. Absolute deprivation/immiseration, 3. Relative deprivation/status inconsistency, and 4. Expected deterioration/threat. As a fifth aspect the project specifies necessary intervening (mediating and moderating) factors. The five aspects and examples of used indicators and sources of data are summarized in Table 1.

1) Overtime decline/loss: Relying on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), various studies show that people react particularly strongly to negative changes (rapid decline, loss or sudden and severe disruption), when existing benefits are taken away from them. For instance, unlike economic growth, an economic recession increases negative media coverage and public concerns about the economy (Soroka 2006; Singer 2013). Also, people and groups having resources or socio-economically secure positions in one period are likely to protest in periods when such a situation is lost and the resources and advantageous position declines (Snow et al. 1998; Almeida 2003; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). For instance, Opp (2000) shows that people experiencing overtime decline of their economic situation (loss of job or lowered income) during crisis times of democratic transformation in Eastern Germany are more likely to protest. Similarly, the sudden and severe change resulting in a loss of everyday quotidian functions as a trigger of protest when “normal times” change into crisis (Snow et al. 1998; Walsh 1981). Borland and Sutton (2007) show this effect on the mobilization of women in the reaction to the Argentinian economic crisis. Although Argentinian women experienced inequality and oppression well before the crisis they mobilized only when the sudden and severe negative change crashing their everyday routines took place. As “overtime deterioration/loss”, the project will study the effect of the “Great Recession” that started in 2008 and is seen as “the most serious economic calamity of our lifetimes” (Treas 2010, 3). Purely the period effect of times of crisis (“normal” times before 2008 and crisis times after) should have effects on protest as it indicates severe and sudden shock salient in politics. As the amount of “loss” varies across countries, since the crisis hit individual countries differently, the project will also compare the amount of over-time socio-economic deterioration in this period, like increases in unemployment and welfare state retrenchments. At the individual level, factors like the recent loss of a job or a decline of resources will be studied.

2) Absolute deprivation/immiseration: The “immiseration” version of grievance theories emphasizes that only sever and unbearable socio-economic conditions will motivate people to protest (Snow and Soule 2009, 34–36). Hence unlike the overtime decline/loss approach this perspective emphasizes the severity of the resulting situation and the absolute level of exiting socio-economic conditions. In this regard, some theorize about the U/J shape effect of socio-economic conditions (Gomez and Hansford 2014) suggesting that only extreme socio-economic hardship increases protest while the rest (non-extreme) values of socio-economic conditions produce a positive effect on protest participation as they grow (i.e. the positive effect known from standard participation literature). For instance, it has been shown, that the large-scale protests related to the economic crisis in Greece resulted from the state´s failure to provide basic public goods and services that led to severe disruption of people´s life, whereas in Ireland the economic crisis did not have this effect since the state kept providing social protection to vulnerable groups (Pappas and O’Malley 2014). We can expect that absolute deprivation is indicated by an extremely low level of welfare state provisions and very low social protection (Radcliff 1992; Anderson and Hecht 2012). Also Rose (2011) shows that vulnerability to economic crisis does not originate in the extent of economic contraction but is

a result of the absolute affluence of the country. People hit by the crisis residing in countries with higher level of GDP are less likely to end up in miserable conditions. The same argument applies to the individual level. Even a high decrease in income might not have a mobilizing effect on rich people, who only become less rich, in contrast to a high effect of a modest decrease in income for poor people. Hence we can expect the combination of structural and individual indicators of absolute deprivation (such as extremely low income, unemployment, low level of welfare state and GDP) to increase individual protest.

3) Relative deprivation/status inconsistency: Another type of factors draws on the classical relative deprivation theory suggesting that what makes socio-economic hardship induce protest is a mechanism of status inconsistency (Walker and Smith 2001; Canache 1996; Gurr 1970). What matters is not over-time decline or absolute misery but the relative position to other people or contexts. Classical relative deprivation theory expects a higher gap between the perceived assessment of one's social group's socio-economic position and the position of others or of an expected position to increase activism. Available empirical evidence on anti-austerity protests supports this perspective because the protestors tended to come from the so called "social precariat" who are, although often well-educated, unemployed or only part-time employed young people, with no work protection and guaranties (Standing 2011; della Porta 2014).

4) Expected deterioration/threat: Social movement literature particularly with its concept of threat and risk management literature in general point at the importance of expectations in contrast to actual experience of deterioration (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Slovic 1987). In this case, the mobilizing effect of socio-economic hardship is not reactive as in previous cases but is proactive. Since people expect to experience a loss or immiseration in the future they get active to prevent this decline from happening. For instance, Kriesi (2014) suggests this effect showing that particularly the announcement of planned austerity measures (and not the economic indicators themselves) triggered (in Iceland and Ireland) or amplified (in Hungary and Latvia) anti-austerity protest events. Similarly, for the individual level, Opp (2000) shows that factors like job insecurity or low possibility of promotion refer to the potential future loss of resources and increase protest. Hence, the project will focus on macro-structural (like the announcement of austerity measures) and individual-level threats (having a vulnerable socio-economic position like an unstable job or the perception of future risks).

5) Intervening factors: The important mechanism suggested by the project of how socio-economic hardship triggers individual protest is politicization. Hence it is expected that the above mentioned indicators of socio-economic hardship will induce individual protest only when amplified in political processes. As suggested, politicization includes two dimensions – general political saliency of the issue and mobilization of political actors. To indicate issue saliency the aggregated public opinion on saliency of the socio-economic problems or saliency of the socio-economic hardship in political discourse indicated by importance of issues mentioned in parties' programs (Party Manifesto Data) will be used. At the individual level, the perception of socio-economic hardship as an important issue and feelings of anger and fear in relation to the socio-economic hardship will be studied. In terms of mobilization, it is expected that the presence of important mobilizing actors at the national political level, particularly strong trade unions and populist (left and right) actors, will increase the likelihood that macro-structural economic deterioration will trigger individual protest (Kriesi et al. 2012, 12). At the individual level, survey questions on involvement in social networks like voluntary group membership (that increase a chance of being recruited) or receiving a direct recruitment appeal will be examined. The analysis will also explore to what extent the politicization of macro-structural socio-economic hardship and its effect on individual protest depends on a country's political institutions. The conditioned effect of economic crisis by national institutions (decentralization, party system, etc.) has been shown on voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Powell and Whitten 1993; Kriesi 2014). Institutional political opportunities (particularly institutional power-separation) also determine protest and mobilization into protest (Kriesi 2004; Vráblíková 2014) and they also might play a role for the effect of socio-economic factors (Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Pappas and O'Malley 2014).

Table 1: Examples of specific indicators and their data sources that will be used

	Macro-structural level	Individual level
Socio-economic hardship		
Overtime decline/ loss	Growth rate, change in unemployment rate, change in poverty[1)], welfare state retrenchment (change in total replacement rates)[2)]	Loss of job in last two years[8),10)]
Absolute deprivation/ immiseration	Extremely low GDP per capita, extreme unemployment rate, extreme poverty rate[1)], extremely low social policy entitlements[2)]	Extremely low income[8),10)], unemployment[8)10)]
Relative deprivation/ status inconsistency	-	Perceived discrimination[11)], high education + no/underemployment etc.[8),10)]
Expected deterioration/ threat	Announcement of austerity measures[3)], share of people expecting situation to get worse[4)]	Expectation of worse economic situation[9)], vulnerable socio-economic position (unstable job)[8),10)]
Intervening factors		
General politicization	share of people who consider crisis as the biggest problem of the country[4)], saliency of issue in parties' campaigning[5)]	Issue importance, feeling of anger and fear[9)]
Mobilization	Presence of mobilizing actors (strong trade unions, populist parties/movements)[6)], institutional power-separation[7)]	Group membership[8),10)], political discussion[8),10)], recruitment[9)]

Suggested data sources: 1) OECD.Stat, 2) OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), 3) A New Action-Based Dataset of Fiscal Consolidation (Devries et al. 2011), 4) Aggregated % from Eurobarometer/various country-specific public opinion surveys, 5) Manifesto Project Database, 6) Qualitative coding of secondary literature, 7) Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset database, 8) CCC case-control data in all 8 countries, 9) CCC case-control data only Czech Republic, 10) Standard questions in comparative surveys on protest (ESS, ISSP citizenship, WVS, EVS), 11) ESS.

4.1.3 Research design and analyses

To examine the interaction between macro-structural and individual factors and their effect on individual protest the project will rely on mixed-methods and triangulation. This approach will integrate different types of data and will enable efficient empirical examinations of the expectations developed.

The greatest challenge for the study of individual participation in protest under hardship is that protest in general is a rare phenomenon when approached by traditionally used method of one-shot single-country nationally representative surveys (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004; van Deth, Montero, and Westholm 2007). As protestors establish only a tiny fraction of the population (on average 5 percent) they are therefore hardly covered by national random samples (usually not more than 50 cases). Given that socio-economically deprive protestors probably form a small portion of all protests, the numbers of cases in a nationally representative survey to which this theory can be applied would be a few cases only. The project uses two research designs that solve this problem (King and Zeng 2001): A repeated cross-sectional (RCS) design of individual surveys across democratic countries over time, and case-control protest surveys.[4]

[4] Other designs that are used to cope with the fact that protest is a rare event are not as efficient. For instance, studies examining protest among sub-populations of socio-economically deprived people (Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009), suffer from a selection bias on the most important explanatory variable (socio-economic hardship) and also on other important factors (as socio-economic hardship correlates with other predictors of protest). Also studying tendencies or intentions to protest (that show more variation in the general population) instead of actual participation (strategy used by social-psychology van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012; Mummendey et al. 1999) is problematic as tendencies to protest

The RCS design includes a huge number of observations at the individual level (compared to the standardly used one-shot single-country surveys)[5], which means that also the absolute number of covered protestors that are otherwise rare cases is also large enough for more robust analyses (King and Zeng 2001).

Protest surveys are particularly good at capturing the socio-economically deprived protestors as they are targeted specifically on these cases that are rare in standard single one-shot nationally representative surveys (van Stekelenburg et al. 2012; Walgrave and Verhulst 2011). However, a common problem of protest surveys is that they study protestors in "no-variance" designs that lack information on people, who did not protest (della Porta 2014; Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). Such studies cannot be used to make inference about causes of participation (specifically to disentangle alternative explanations) because they lack the control/negative cases (Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015). To solve this problem, the project will rely on an original research strategy developed by the applicant that extends the protest surveys into case-control studies. Case-control studies are often used in epidemiology and are a very efficient way of how to cope with the problem of rare cases on one hand and building a variation design enabling valid causal inference on the other hand (King and Zeng 2001; Vráblíková and Traunmüller 2015). It lies in selection on the depend variable that proceeds in two steps – representative sampling of cases (survey of protestors) and representative sampling of controls (sample representative to a general population). This design assures that the sample is not biased on potential explanatory variables.

These two research designs – RCS and case-control protest surveys – will be used in three steps.

1) Qualitative analyses of socio-economically different country contexts combined with quantitative analyses of individual-level socio-economic determinants of protest at various demonstrations taking place in those contexts will be carried out (Month 3-6). For these analyses already existing data from the comparative surveys of protestors ("Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation", CCC, see Stekelenburg et al. 2012) including almost 100 various demonstrations gathered in eight European democracies during and right after the Great Recession (2009-2013) will be used.[6] The CCC data will be expanded into case-control studies by combining it with recoded national population survey data from the corresponding waves of the European Social Survey. This will provide the protest survey data set with necessary zeros/non-participants and basic independent variables.[7] This first part of the project will examine the differences in individual-level predictors of protest at different types of demonstrations to explore the two different pathways of protest ("protest under hardship" and "protest of well-off postmaterialist") (Vráblíková 2015). Importantly, a qualitative analysis comparing the eight different macro-economic contexts will allow exploring the effects and processes linking the macro-economic country conditions with differences in individual-level determinants of protest under hardship into more detail (comparing predictors of participation in protest under socio-economic hardship across the eight countries). As rich data have been also collected on mobilizing actors sponsoring the protests and the specific political environment of protest (saliency of the issue, reactions of politicians etc.), the analysis will be able to explore the role of macro-level politicization as well. These analyses will help further

---

and actual protest are very different concepts, they correlate only moderately and also differ in their predictors (Klandermans and Oegema 1987).

[5] The largest dataset that will be used (depending on the availability of survey questions in the surveys) will include around 200.000 respondents in 30 democracies in 8 waves (2002-2014).

[6] The included countries show a variation on macro-structural socio-economic hardship (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom). 44 out of the 100 covered demonstrations were demonstrations against socio-economic hardship (demonstrations against budget cuts, poverty, unemployment, etc.).

[7] A particular use will be made especially of data from the Czech Republic as we designed the Czech part of the CCC project from the very beginning as a case-control study including both, survey of protestors and of a general national population and hence included a large number of the same survey questions into both surveys (particularly questions on recruitment and emotions).

develop the multilevel theory on the interplay between macro-structural and individual-level socio-economic hardship.

2) The second part will focus mainly on testing of the multilevel theory by a quantitative examination of the macro-level socio-economic factors and their effect on individual activism and its micro-determinants. Here the RCS design including individual survey respondents across democratic countries over-time, pooled data from various sources (World/European Values Survey (WVS; EVS), European Social Survey (ESS), and country specific repeated surveys, such as the US General Survey) will be used. These data will be supplemented by country/time-level indicators mentioned above (Month 5-7). The analyses will need to be very much theoretically driven especially when modeling the time-series dynamics of the second level as the standard time-series tests for very short time series are unreliable.[8] The most advanced type of analysis (using the largest dataset) will apply a strategy recently developed by Lebo and Weber (2015) – double filtering with ARFIMA (autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average) methods followed by multilevel modeling (MLM) – that allows reliable estimation of both aggregate and individual level parameters in RCS designs simultaneously and to study time-varying relationships (Month 7-12).[9] Particularly important for this project is the fact that this strategy will allow to estimate cross-level interactions between macro- (cross-time/national) and individual-level indicators of socio-economic hardship (i.e. for instance the time/country varying effect of unemployment rate on worse and well-off non/participants). As socio-economic hardship is not randomly distributed and is endogenous, the project will adopt an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator as a robustness check of the most important findings.

3) The third part of the project will complement the previous quantitative parts of the project with more detailed exploration of micro-level effects of socio-economic hardship and the intervening individual-level factors in a two strategically selected country contexts. The reason is that the comparative nationally representative surveys do not cover a lot of concepts implied by the theory (recruitment, emotions etc.). Also the existing CCC data cannot be used for this analysis as except of the Czech Republic, control data including these important concepts were not gathered. Hence the additional data gathering will complement this gap in the existing data. The selection of the two country contexts where the two case-control surveys will be gathered will be driven by results from the second part of the project based on the diverse-case method (Gerring 2010) that selects the cases based on a variation or a combination of values on the key contextual variables. Specifically, the results from a quantitative examination of the macro-level socio-economic factors will be used to determine two typical socio-economic country contexts representing theoretically most important combination of key contextual factors that will be derived from the analyses. A number of individual-level factors will be included in the two case-control protest surveys (Month 11-12). The data gathering of the two new case-control protest survey data in two different countries (Mont 13-17) will follow the developed methodology of protest surveying.[10] Here I will rely on

[8] The design is stronger in terms of cross-sectional variation. Models with around 30 countries at the second level of analysis are standardly used in comparative politics and controls that need to be included, such as political institutions and culture, have been already well-studied (Vráblíková 2014).

[9] Most of existing studies using the RCS design have failed to perform the integrated analysis of both levels. The problem was that standard solutions used in time series analyses to cope with autocorrelation (lagged dependent variable or differencing) cannot be used in RCS designs as the individuals appear but once in the data. In a nutshell, the analysis here in the first step will lie in fractional differencing (finding the appropriate noise model and filter for the aggregate level and taking the deviations of individual-level units from the second level values to cope with individual-level serial correlation) and in the second step it will use a multilevel modeling (modeling the hierarchical structure of the double-filtered data and estimating effect of contextual and unit-specific predictors) (Lebo and Weber 2015).

[10] I.e. team of interviewers and pointers (volunteering students), random sampling of respondents within the crowd, full anonymity is assured since personal data of respondents are never available to researchers, distribution of pre-paid envelopes with the survey, face-to-face short interviews with a smaller number of respondents to determine the selection bias of the postal survey etc., see Walgrave and Verhulst 2011.

my extensive experiences with designing and fielding protest surveys and the rich international scientific networks I have to help me organize the data gathering in the two selected countries. As a novel enhancement of the protest surveying method also data on non-participants representative of the general population will be simultaneously gathered. Here a small scale survey of non-participants sampled via quota sampling of a sample size similar to the participant survey will be conducted.

4.2 Second research question: *Which democratic values and political preferences are brought into politics by socio-economically deprived protestors?*

To answer this question, the project will focus on "profiling" of socio-economically deprived protestors, which will tell us what values and norms they bring to politics.

4.2.1 Protest under Socio-Economic Hardship and Political Representation

This part of the project will further develop the existing theoretical discussions on political representation and political equality (Month 3). Specifically, it will focus on outcome-oriented or consequentialist interpretation of political representation (Teorell and Tobiasen 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 171). This perspective suggests that next to explicitly expressed preferences also preferences that are implicit to participants' characteristics are important for democratic political representation. Hence, the important input to politics is not only what people explicitly say as a message to be heard but also whose voice is heard – participants' stands on other political issues, their democratic as well as their social norms and values. As the basic democratic requirement is political equality, it is important to examine if some types of voices are over- or under-represented in the public arena and what specific message these voices express. The goal here is not explanatory (which is often confused in studies' focused on this topic by the use of multivariate regressions), the aim is to describe democratic and social norms and values of socio-economically deprived protestors and compare how they deviate from: a) the general population, b) well-studied better-off protestors (usually depicted as leftist, democratic, solidary, tolerant etc.), and c) how the values and norms of socio-economically deprived protestors change over time.

4.2.2 Research Design, Indicators, and Analyses

Drawing on existing literature (Kerbo 1982), there are two different aspects that seem to be important for the distinction of protestors under socio-economic hardship (that do not necessarily overlap): 1. The character of protestors (their socio-economic background) and 2. The goal of protest (protest addressing socio-economic deprivation and exclusion). The first perspective will be applied when analyzing the comparative nationally representative surveys. A latent class analysis of individual protestors including various socio-economic indicators will be used to empirically distinguish different types of protestors based on their socio-economic situation. Such categories of protestors will be then compared across each other, with the countries' general population, over time and across countries. The second perspective will be applied by the analysis of protest surveys. Here the primary comparative dimension will be across different types of demonstrations and across countries. Specifically, demonstration representing protest under socio-economic hardship and of "well-off postmaterialists" will be distinguished and norms and values of their participants will be compared (Mont 16-18). Drawing on standardly used conceptual framework of democratic values, social norms and political preferences and data availability, the project will examine the indicators summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Examples of specific indicators and their data sources that will be used

Democratic norms	Democratic regime support, support for freedom of speech, importance of elections etc.[1)]
Political and social tolerance	Allow political meeting, accepting minorities as neighbors[2)]
Norms of citizenship	Solidarity with other people, other nations, compliance, independence[3)]

Policy preferences	Left-Right self-placement, redistribution, immigration policy etc.[4)]

Suggest data sources: 1) WVS, EVS, ESS 2002 and 2014, 2) WVS, EVS, CID, 3) WVS, EVS, ESS 2002, ISSP citizenship, Czech CCC 4) WVS, EVS, ISSP Citizenship, ESS, CID, CCC.

The empirical results answering the two research questions will be then interpreted in the light of democratic theory and implications for the prospects of representative democracies will be developed (Month 19-21). Particularly, the results will be used to develop further our understanding of political integration of socio-economically deprived people: character of their participation, related challenges, special needs and aspects that are different from more usual and well-studied political activism of people with higher socio-economic status.

4.3 Deliverables and time schedule

In the final stage, the project will focus on the finalization of deliverables from the project (Month 18-24). Specifically, in addition to the already existing three article manuscript drafts, three new articles will be submitted to top political science and sociology journals. During the project, the manuscript versions of the articles will be gradually developed, presented at the conferences (Joint Sessions of the European Consortium of Political Research, Mid-west Political Science Conference, International Conference of Europeanists), workshops and discussed with colleagues to get feedback and comments for further development. The time schedule of the project is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Time-schedule of the project

Month of the project	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
1st research question																								
Theory development and literature review																								
Small N country level analysis of CCC data																								
Collection of macro-structural data and completion of the RCS surveys																								
Analysis of the RCS data																								
Theory development and designing of two case-control protest surveys																								
Collection of 2 case-control protest surveys																								
Analysis of two case-control protest surveys																								
2nd research question																								
Theory development and literature review																								
Analysis - "profiling" of different protestors																								
Specification of implications for representative democracies																								
Deliverables																								
Finalization of publications																								
Participation at conferences																								

4.4 Bibliography

Abrams, Dominic, and Peter R. Grant. 2012. “Testing the Social Identity Relative Deprivation (SIRD) Model of Social Change: The Political Rise of Scottish Nationalism.” *The British Journal of Social Psychology / the British Psychological Society* 51 (4): 674–89.
Abramson, Paul R., and William Claggett. 2001. “Recruitment and Political Participation.” *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (4): 905–16.
Almeida, Paul D. 2003. “Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings.” *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (2): 345–400.
Anderson, Christopher J., and Jason D. Hecht. 2012. “Voting When the Economy Goes Bad, Everyone Is in Charge, and No One Is to Blame: The Case of the 2009 German Election.” *Electoral Studies*, Special Symposium: Germany’s Federal Election September 2009, 31 (1): 5–19.
Beissinger, Mark R., and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2014. “The End to ‘Patience’? The Great Recession and Economic Protest in Eastern Europe.” In *Mass Politics in Tough Times : Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*, edited by Nancy Gina Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels, 334–70. Oxford ua: Oxford UnivPress.
Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (January): 611–39.
Bernstein, Mary. 2005. “Identity Politics.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 31 (January): 47–74.
Boin, Arjen, Paul ’t Hart, and Allan McConnell. 2009. “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (1): 81–106.
Borland, Elizabeth, and Barbara Sutton. 2007. “Quotidian Disruption and Women’s Activism in Times of Crisis, Argentina 2002-2003.” *Gender & Society* 21 (5): 700–722.
Brady, Henry E., Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 1999. “Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists.” *The American Political Science Review* 93 (1): 153.
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation.” *The American Political Science Review* 89 (2): 271–94.
Buechler. Steve M. 2004. “The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 47–66. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Buechler, Steven M. 1999. *Social Movements In Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press, U.S.A.
Canache, Damarys. 1996. “Looking Out My Back Door: The Neighborhood Context and Perceptions of Relative Deprivation.” *Political Research Quarterly* 49 (3): 547–71.
Corrigall-Brown, Catherine, David A. Snow, Kelly Smith, and Theron Quist. 2009. “Explaining the Puzzle of Homeless Mobilization: An Examination of Differential Participation.” *Sociological Perspectives* 52 (3): 309–35.
Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. *The Good Citizen*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
Dalton, Russell J, Alix Van Sickle, and Steven Weldon. 2010. “The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour.” *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (01): 51–73.
della Porta, Donatella. 2014. *Social Movements in Times of Austerity. Bringing Capitalism Back In*. Polity Press.
Devries, Pete, Jaime Guajardo, Daniel Leigh, and Andrea Pescatori. 2011. “A New Action-Based Dataset of Fiscal Consolidation.” *IMF Working Paper*, no. 11/128: 1–91.
Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2008. *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge University Press.
EC. 2014. “HORIZON 2020: Focus Area ‘Overcoming the Crisis: New Ideas, Strategies, and Governance Structures for Europe.’”
Edwards, Bob, and John D McCarthy. 2004. “Resources and Social Movement Mobilization.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 116–52. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Gerring, John. 2010. “Case Selection Fo Case-Study Analysis: Qalitative and Qantitative Techniques.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, 645–84. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldstone, Jack, and Charles Tilly. 2001. “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamic of Conventious Action.” In *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, edited by Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell Jr, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 179–94. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gomez, Brad T., and Thomas G. Hansford. 2014. “Economic Retrospection and the Calculus of Voting.” *Political Behavior* 37 (2): 309–29.
Grasso, Maria T., and Marco G. Giugni. 2015. *Austerity and Protest. Popular Contention in Times of Economic Crisis*. Ashgate.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Paradigm Publishers.
———. 1993. “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945.” *International Political Science Review* 14 (2): 161–201.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Theresa Capelos, and Colin Provost. 2002. “The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat.” *Political Psychology* 23 (3): 485–509.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
———. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jenkins, J. Craig, Thomas V. Maher, and Chuck Fahrer. 2014. “Seedbeds of Insurgency Structure and Dynamics in the Egyptian Islamist Insurgency, 1986–99.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (4): 470–86.
Jenkins, J. Craig, and Charles Perrow. 1977. “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972).” *American Sociological Review* 42 (2): 249–68.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” *Econometrica* 47 (2): 263–91.
Kam, Cindy D., and Donald R. Kinder. 2007. “Terror and Ethnocentrism: Foundations of American Support for the War on Terrorism.” *The Journal of Politics* 69 (02): 320–38.
Kawakami, Kerry, and Kenneth L. Dion. 1995. “Social Identity and Affect as Determinants of Collective Action Toward an Integration of Relative Deprivation and Social Identity Theories.” *Theory & Psychology* 5 (4): 551–77.
Keeler, John T. S. 1993. “Opening the Window for Reform Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making.” *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (4): 433–86.
Kerbo, Harold R. 1982. “Movements of ‘Crisis’ and Movements of ‘Affluence’ A Critique of Deprivation and Resource Mobilization Theories.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (4): 645–63.
Kern, Anna, Sofie Marien, and Marc Hooghe. 2015. “Economic Crisis and Levels of Political Participation in Europe (2002–2010): The Role of Resources and Grievances.” *West European Politics* 38 (3): 465–90.
Khawaja, Marwan. 1994. “Resource Mobilization, Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in the West Bank.” *Social Forces* 73 (1): 191–220.
King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data.” *Political Analysis* 9 (2): 137–63.
Klandermans, Bert. 1984. “Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansisons of Resource Mobilization Theory.” *American Sociological Review* 49 (5): 583–600.
Klandermans, Bert, and Dirk Oegema. 1987. “Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements.” *American Sociological Review* 52 (4): 519–31.
Klandermans, Bert, Jojanneke van der Toorn, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg. 2008. “Embeddedness and Identity: How Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action.” *American Sociological Review* 73 (6): 992–1012.
Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 1999. “Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy.” In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, 225–51. Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press.
Kornhauser, William. 2010. *Politics of Mass Society*. 1 edition. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Kriesi. Hanspeter. 2004. “Political Context and Opportunity.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 67–90. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2014. “The Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest.” In *Mass Politics in Tough Times : Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*, edited by Nancy Gina Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels, 297–333. Oxford ua: Oxford UnivPress.
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest. 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lebo, Matthew J., and Christopher Weber. 2015. “An Effective Approach to the Repeated Cross-Sectional Design.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 242–58.
Leighley, Jan E. 2001. *Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities.* Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Letki, Natalia. 2006. “Investigating the Roots of Civic Morality: Trust, Social Capital, and Institutional Performance.” *Political Behavior* 28 (4): 305–25.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 2014. *The Communist Manifesto*. New edition edition. New York: International Publishers Co.
McAdam, Doug, John D McCarthy, and Mayer Zald N. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press.
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” *The American Journal of Sociology*.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick. 1995. “Review Essay: The Psychology of Genocide.” *Ethics & International Affairs* 9 (1): 215–39.
Mummendey, Amélie, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink, and Rosemarie Mielke. 1999. “Strategies to Cope with Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76 (2): 229–45.
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. First Printing edition. Oxford England ; New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa, Stefaan Walgrave, and Peter Van Aelst. 2005. “Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?” *Comparative Politics* 37 (2): 189–205.
OECD. 2011. *Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising*. OECD Publishing.
Oegema, Dirk, and Bert Klandermans. 1994. “Why Social Movement Sympathizers Don’t Participate: Erosion and Nonconversion of Support.” *American Sociological Review* 59 (5): 703–22.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2000. “Adverse Living Conditions, Grievances, and Political Protest after Communism: The Example of East Germany.” *Social Forces* 79 (1): 29–65.

Pappas, Takis S., and Eoin O'Malley. 2014. "Civil Compliance and 'Political Luddism' Explaining Variance in Social Unrest During Crisis in Ireland and Greece." *American Behavioral Scientist*, 58 (12): 1592–1613.
Parkin, Frank. 1968. *Middle Class Radicalism*. First Edition edition. New York: Manchester University Press.
Pattie, Charles, Patrick Seyd, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. 1977. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage.
Ponticelli, Jacopo, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2011. "Austerity and Anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in Europe, 1919-2008." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1899287. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (2): 391–414.
Radcliff, Benjamin. 1992. "The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 86 (2): 444–54.
Richards, David L., and Ronald D. Gelleny. 2006. "Banking Crises, Collective Protest and Rebellion." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 39 (4): 777–801.
Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 2003. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Longman.
Rose, Richard. 2011. "Micro-Economic Responses to a Macro-Economic Crisis: A Pan-European Perspective." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27 (3-4): 364–84.
Rüdig, Wolfgang, and Georgios Karyotis. 2014. "Who Protests in Greece? Mass Opposition to Austerity." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (03): 487–513.
Schäfer, Armin. 2010. "Consequences of Social Inequality for Democracy in Western Europe." *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 6 (2): 23–45.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and Sidney Verba. 1979. *Injury to Insult : Unemployment, Class, and Political Response*. Cambridge, Massua: Harvard UnivPr.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Schussman, Alan, and Sarah A. Soule. 2005. "Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation." *Social Forces* 84 (2): 1083–1108.
Schwadel, Philip, and Christopher R. H. Garneau. 2014. "An Age–Period–Cohort Analysis of Political Tolerance in the United States." *The Sociological Quarterly* 55 (2): 421–52.
Shefner, Jon. 1999. "Sponsors and the Urban Poor: Resources or Restrictions?" *Social Problems* 46 (3): 376–97.
Singer, Matthew M. 2013. "The Global Economic Crisis and Domestic Political Agendas." *Electoral Studies*, Economics and Elections: Effects Deep and Wide, 32 (3): 404–10.
Slovic, Paul. 1987. "Perception of Risk." *Science* 236 (4799): 280–85.
Smelser, Neil J. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
Snow, David A, Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey, and Andrew W. Jones. 1998. "Disrupting the 'Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relationship between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 3 (1): 1–22.
Snow, David A., and Sarah A. Soule. 2009. *A Primer on Social Movements*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Soroka, Stuart N. 2006. "Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 372–85.
Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Stolle, Dietlind, and Marc Hooghe. 2011. "Shifting Inequalities." *European Societies* 13 (1): 119–42.
Teorell, Jan, and M. Tobiasen. 2007. "Participation and Political Equality: An Assessment of Large-Scale Democracy." In *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*, edited by Jan W. van Deth, José R Montero, and Westholm, Anders, 384–414. London; New York: Routledge.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass: Longman Higher Education.
Treas, Judith. 2010. "The Great American Recession: Sociological Insights on Blame and Pain." *Sociological Perspectives* 53 (1): 3–18.
Turner, Ralph H., and Lewis M. Killian. 1987. *Collective Behavior*. Pearson Education Canada.
Uhlaner, Carole J. 1989. "Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups." *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (2): 390–422.
Useem, Bert. 1980. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement." *American Sociological Review* 45 (3): 357–69.
van Deth, Jan W., José Ramón Montero, and Anders Westholm. 2007. *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*. Taylor & Francis.
Van Dyke, Nella, and Sarah A. Soule. 2002. "Structural Social Change and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: Explaining Levels of Patriot and Militia Organizing in the United States." *Social Problems* 49 (4): 497–520.
van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, and Bert Klandermans. 2013. "The Social Psychology of Protest." *Current Sociology* 61 (5-6): 886–905.
van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Stefaan Walgrave, Bert Klandermans, and Joris Verhulst. 2012. "Contextualizing contestation. Framework, design and data." *Mobilization* 17 (3): 249–62.
van Zomeren, Martijn, C. W. Leach, and R. Spears. 2012. "Protesters as 'Passionate Economists': A Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping With Collective Disadvantage." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 16 (2): 180–99.

van Zomeren, Martijn, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears. 2008. “Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives.” *Psychological Bulletin* 134 (4): 504–35.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Vráblíková, Kateřina. 2014. “How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures, and Nonelectoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (2): 203–29.

———. 2015. “Privileged Post-Materialists or Excluded Radicals? Different Pathways of Protest Participation in a Case-Control Study.” *Paper Presented at the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main, May 26, 2015*.

Vráblíková, Kateřina, and Lukáš Linek. 2015. “Explaining the Composition of an Individual’s Political Repertoire: Voting and Protesting.” *Paper Prepared for the 2015 MPSA Conference Chicago, April 16 - 19, 2015*.

Vráblíková, Kateřina, and Richard Traunmüller. 2015. “Zero the Hero: Upgrading Targeted Surveys to Case-Control Designs.” *Paper Prepared for the 2015 ECPR Conference Montreal, August 26 - 29, 2015*.

Walgrave, Stefaan, and Joris Verhulst. 2011. “Selection and Response Bias in Protest Surveys.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (2): 203–22.

Walker, Iain, and Heather J. Smith. 2001. *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walsh, Edward J. 1981. “Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island.” *Social Problems* 29 (1): 1–21.

Welzel, Christian, and Franziska Deutsch. 2012. “Emancipative Values and Non-Violent Protest: The Importance of ‘Ecological’ Effects.” *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (02): 465–79.

Wilkes, Rima. 2004. “First Nation Politics: Deprivation, Resources, and Participation in Collective Action.” *Sociological Inquiry* 74 (4): 570–89.