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1 **POLITICAL AND CIVIC**
2 **ENGAGEMENT**

3 Multidisciplinary perspectives

4 *Edited by Martyn Barrett and Bruna Zani*

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- 1 **To all those who made it possible to realise the research**
- 2 **reported in this volume, especially the young people,**
- 3 **women, ethnic minorities and migrants whose voices**
- 4 **should be heard.**

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**INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION AND MACRO
CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS**

Kateřina Vráblíková and Ondřej Císař¹

6 Introduction

The macro-context, traditionally understood by the comparative politics literature as the nation state, obviously has an effect on individual political participation. The available studies have shown dramatic cross-country differences in how active citizens of various states are in politics; explanations of participation across these countries can differ, too. Until lately the lesson taken from these observations has been that social phenomena must be studied in their particular contexts, which in practice meant controlling for the country context in various ways. For instance, studies have analysed individual political participation separately in particular countries or geographical regions, such as the old Western democracies and the newer democracies of Central-Eastern Europe, or South America.

However, this ‘context sensitivity’ recognises the role of the macro-context only to a limited extent. As argued by the classical comparative social science literature decades ago, the macro-context should be seen as a research puzzle in itself, not just as an inconvenient element inserting error into the quasi-universalist laws governing human behaviour. The macro-context should be approached theoretically as a relevant explanation of its elements and the processes taking place within it. Specifically, even the macro-context of national states is characterised by attributes that systematically influence individual political participation and the processes that affect it within these contexts (see the chapter by Brunton-Smith and Barrett in this volume). Hence the crucial research question is obvious: What are the relevant characteristics of the macro-context, and how do they affect individual-level political participation?

Only recently has this question begun to be asked and more systematically examined by the literature on political participation. This holds especially for political participation beyond voting. While macro-contextual research on voter

1 turnout has been a more or less well-established stream of research, only lately has
2 the macro-contextual perspective on individual non-electoral political participation
3 both in terms of theories and their empirical testing triggered much political par-
4 ticipation research. The goal of this chapter is to review the available literature on
5 the macro-contextual determinants of individual political participation, particularly
6 non-electoral participation. Before doing that, we will first discuss the classical
7 agenda of political participation theories, which have emphasised the individual
8 predispositions of potential participants, and have also studied the ‘meso-level’ pre-
9 dictors such as mobilisation and social networks. Then we identify the three main
10 categories of macro-contextual determinants of individual political participation
11 heretofore recognised by the available studies: political institutions, socio-economic
12 conditions and political culture. We first discuss the direct effect of these character-
13 istics on individual political participation. Second, we focus on interaction effects,
14 that is on the conditioning effect of contextual characteristics on the individual-
15 level predictors of political participation. We conclude the review by identifying
16 potential gaps and challenges in the available literature, formulating potential
17 avenues for future research.

18 Theories of political participation

19 *Micro-level theories*

20 Political science research on political participation has been widely dominated by
21 micro-level approaches which emphasise individual predispositions as determinants
22 of political participation. In the first place, the most attention has been paid to
23 individuals’ socio-economic status, mainly due to the very influential research of
24 Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba *et al.* 1978;
25 Verba *et al.* 1995; Schlozman *et al.* 2012). The main finding of this stream of research
26 was that political participation is unequally distributed among citizens and skewed
27 towards those who are privileged. The explanation of why higher socio-economic
28 status (SES) leads to more political participation is that SES is most of the time
29 interrelated with the individual resources that are necessary for participation in
30 politics. Individual resources, such as time, skills and money, help overcome the costs
31 of participation, and hence participation is easier for people who individually
32 possess them. In addition to SES, the role of individual civic orientations and atti-
33 tudes has been researched. Various studies have shown that people who are more
34 interested in politics feel a civic duty to participate, have higher levels of social trust,
35 have higher political efficacy and are more likely to participate in politics (Dalton
36 2008; Norris 2002; Armingeon 2007).

37 The micro-level approach favouring personal characteristics – SES and civic
38 orientations – as the crucial determinants of individual political participation has
39 several consequences for our understanding of participation and the policy decisions
40 that are made. Firstly, putting the main emphasis on individual resources and moti-
41 vations fails to explain the timing and geography of individual political participation

1 (Leighley 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Although the micro-level approach
2 can tell us what type of people usually tend to participate, predispositions can hardly
3 answer when and where people participate. Political participation fluctuates
4 dramatically over time and place; for instance, people sign petitions and contact
5 politicians only on some occasions and at some locations. However, SES and most
6 of the civic orientations which affect political participation are more or less stable
7 characteristics which do not change that quickly and are unable to account for this
8 cross-context fluctuation.

9 Secondly, this approach underestimates the social character of political participa-
10 tion (Knoke 1990; Leighley 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). The micro-level
11 approach sees individuals as isolated units and implies that political participation is
12 performed spontaneously by atomised individuals. However, people do not make
13 their participatory choices in a vacuum but are sensitive to a number of influences
14 coming from their socio-political surroundings. A number of researchers have
15 argued that even seemingly individual types of political participation, such as voting,
16 are still heavily social (Knoke 1990). Even in the case of activities that should be the
17 most individualised and hence least dependent on individuals' social surroundings,
18 such as boycotting and contacting public officials, comparative studies show that
19 fewer than one-third describe their performance of these activities as exclusively the
20 result of their own initiative without any help from others (Kaase 1990).

21 Thirdly, the focus on predispositions also has important normative and policy
22 implications. Taking this perspective seriously, political participation would seem
23 to originate from the non-political world. Rosenstone and Hansen have com-
24 plained that micro-theories of political participation 'do not have much to say
25 about politics' (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003: 3). Following the micro-level
26 approach, individual political participation is not primarily related to what is going
27 on in politics: it is not a response to actual political quarrels, not related to political
28 parties or social movements and not affected by the design of institutions. On the
29 contrary, political participation originates from who the people are. If participa-
30 tion is primarily a matter of social stratification and civic orientation, then the
31 possibilities for effective short-term policy change are very limited. For instance,
32 if we wanted to increase political participation, we would have to change people's
33 individual resources and civic motivations, which are, however, difficult to
34 manipulate.

35 A number of policy programmes drawing on the micro-level perspective are
36 being implemented. These policy strategies include citizens' civic education pro-
37 grammes that try to increase public political and civic involvement by promoting
38 civic skills, political awareness and civic values to individual citizens. The difficulty
39 of these policy programmes in bringing about large-scale change is that because
40 they are trying to manipulate rather stable characteristics, such as resources and
41 civic orientations, they require long-term influences. Simultaneously, since their
42 effect is attached to the education of every single individual, the potential range of
43 effect of these usually small-scale projects focused on a few local communities is
44 questionable.

1 *Meso-level theories*

2 Although the greatest attention has been paid to the micro-level explanations,
3 particularly to the SES model, this does not mean that the political participation
4 literature has entirely disregarded meso-level socio-political influences on participa-
5 tion. Here, attention has been focused on the effect of people's connections to their
6 acquaintances, social groups and discussion networks, and recruitment by politicians
7 and activists. However, this type of determinant, especially when tested on partici-
8 patory activities other than voting, has been researched to a much lesser extent
9 by the political science literature, or these influences have been interpreted through
10 the perspective of micro-level explanations (for a review, see Abramson and
11 Claggett 2001). For instance, although the study by Verba and colleagues specifies
12 mobilisation as the third important component determining political participation,
13 they still devote most of their attention to SES and individual resources (Verba *et al.*
14 1995). Also, when analysing recruitment they use very severe restrictions that make
15 it very unlikely that they will find the effect of mobilisation, or do not study it at all
16 as an independent variable of participation (Verba *et al.* 1995; Brady *et al.* 1999).

17 When studying membership in voluntary associations and groups, these authors
18 also specify the mechanism of its influence through individual predispositions. For
19 Verba and his colleagues, voluntary associations affect individual political participa-
20 tion by producing individual resources, particularly civic skills (Verba *et al.* 1995).
21 Similarly, Putnam's social capital theory (2000) expects social networks among
22 individuals established within these organisations to mainly affect civic orientation,
23 specifically to produce trust and reciprocity, which subsequently leads to higher
24 participation in politics. Hence, according to this perspective, the primary reason
25 why the social surroundings of voluntary groups matter for political participation is
26 the change in micro-predisposition (resources and civic orientations) and not the
27 effects of recruitment, information flow or politics in general.

28 There is an important stream of the political participation literature and espe-
29 cially social movement literature which sees political participation primarily as a
30 social activity heavily dependent on mobilisation and the informational aspect of
31 individuals' socio-political surroundings. These authors point out that political
32 participation must be organised, and emphasise mobilisation by politicians, activists,
33 media, voluntary groups and personal discussion networks through the explicit
34 recruitment of individuals or the transmission of politically relevant information
35 (Abramson and Claggett 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Huckfeldt and Sprague
36 1992; Knoke 1990; Leighley 1996; McAdam 1988; McAdam *et al.* 1996; McAdam
37 1986; Norris 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Shussman and Soule 2005;
38 Teorell 2003; Uhlaner 1989; Verba *et al.* 1978; Verba *et al.* 1995; Wielhouwer and
39 Lockerbie 1994).

40 Although this type of literature has been growing recently, especially on the
41 effects of discussion networks (Mutz 2002, 2006; McClurg 2003, 2006), most
42 mobilisation research into political participation deals with voting. Mobilisation and
43 recruitment, which should be even more important for other types of participation,

1 are not studied to any degree (Abramson and Claggett 2001). Clear evidence of this
2 situation is the lack of indicators falling below the meso-level of explanation in
3 standard political participation surveys. None of the most important comparative
4 survey programmes focusing on political participation ask questions about recruit-
5 ment into political participation other than voting.

6 **Macro-level theories**

7 Beyond one's immediate social surroundings, i.e. people's social networks and their
8 recruitment by political elites, there is also a much wider macro-context that shapes
9 incentives for political participation. This macro-context, such as political institu-
10 tions and national culture, provides an arena in which the political participation and
11 mobilising activity of social networks and political elites takes place. With the
12 exception of voting, which has been well researched from this point of view (Dalton
13 and Anderson 2011; Geys 2006; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller
14 1995; Karp and Banducci 2008; Norris 2002; Blais 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska
15 1998), the role of the macro-context for other types of individual political partici-
16 pation has been seriously overlooked until recently (but see Verba *et al.* 1978;
17 Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

18 This is not to say that comparative research on political participation does not
19 exist – rather the opposite. However, most of the comparative studies have not
20 taken the macro-context seriously as a research puzzle in itself. The vast majority of
21 comparative studies instead control for the effect of national context, and test the
22 micro- and meso-theories across contexts without trying to see how and why
23 national context affects participation (Armingeon 2007; Teorell *et al.* 2007; Marien
24 *et al.* 2010; Dalton 2008). Even the comparative political participation study by
25 Verba *et al.* (1978), which has gone farthest from the main body of studies in this
26 regard and theorised about the effect of political institutions and socio-economic
27 cleavages on inequality in political participation, was not constructed to study
28 the macro-context. On the contrary, the main purpose was to show that the
29 'individual-level law' of socio-economic resources holds across various types of
30 national context. For this reason, the authors selected 'the maximum difference
31 research design', which 'is strong if one is seeking for uniformities across nations.'
32 For them 'cross-national heterogeneity ... is essentially an unspecified heterogene-
33 ity' (Verba *et al.* 1978: 24).

34 This lack of primarily macro-contextual analyses of political participation
35 beyond voting comes as a surprise, because this very puzzle has been an essential
36 focus of comparative politics since its very beginning (Przeworski and Teune 1970;
37 Lazarsfeld and Melzel 1965; Almond and Verba 1963). Przeworski and Teune
38 (1970: 7) explicitly acknowledge that 'identification of the social system in which
39 a given phenomenon occurs is a part of its explanation'. Similarly, Almond and
40 Verba (1963) point out that micropolitics (individual behaviour) can be explained
41 by macropolitics (characteristics of political systems). Lazarsfeld and Melzel
42 (1965) describe the same idea when referring to members and their collectives.

1 The main point emphasised by this literature is that individuals are embedded in
2 different types of contexts that affect both their individual activities and the atti-
3 tudes and processes that lead to these attitudes and activities. When studying these
4 contexts, comparative social science research should go beyond the simple determi-
5 nation of these various contexts. Specifically, identifying that political participation
6 is higher in the US and that SES plays a bigger role in the US than in Germany is
7 not enough to study context effectively. In order to perform effective comparative
8 analysis and study context seriously, researchers should move ‘from cases to varia-
9 bles’ (Przeworski and Teune 1970) and examine what contextual characteristics
10 make the US and Germany different (see also Chapter 11 by Brunton-Smith and
11 Barrett in this volume).

12 Compared to the political science literature dealing with the individual deter-
13 minants of political participation, the social movement literature has, since the
14 1970s, been working intensively on the macro-structural theory of political oppor-
15 tunity structure (POS), which is understood to be one of the most crucial determi-
16 nants of the mobilisation of social movements (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1995; Meyer
17 2004; Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1998; Kriesi *et al.* 1995). The POS is conceptualised as
18 the various characteristics of the external environment, mostly the formal and
19 informal aspects of state institutions and elite politics, that shape people’s incentives
20 for activism (Tarrow 1998: 76–8). However, until lately this theory has not been
21 used for the macro-level explanation of individual-level political participation. It
22 has been used to explain variations over time in the mobilisation of particular social
23 movements (McAdam 1999; Meyer and Minkoff 2008), or in qualitative small-N
24 studies comparing protest across a limited number of countries (Kriesi *et al.* 1995;
25 Kitschelt 1986).

26 Only very recently have researchers started to study the macro-context of
27 citizens’ political behaviour beyond voting as the main research problem and in a
28 more systematic way. The recent boom in these studies is to a large extent possible
29 thanks to the availability of a large quantity of comparative survey data and new
30 statistical techniques. Recently a large number of comparative surveys focused on
31 political participation and related concepts have been made available, such as the
32 World Value Survey, the European Social Survey, the International Social Survey
33 Programme and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which make possible
34 systematic statistical large-N analyses of individual political participation across
35 time and space. Also, a suitable statistical technique in the form of multilevel or
36 hierarchical modelling (Gelman and Hill 2007; Hox 2010), which is able to effec-
37 tively analyse the interplay between micro- and macro-determinants of individual
38 political participation, has only recently become available and popular among a
39 wider group of political participation researchers (for more see Chapter 11 by
40 Brunton-Smith and Barrett in this volume and Brunton-Smith 2011). The follow-
41 ing text will summarise this more or less new stream of literature, review the most
42 important findings on how the characteristics of the macro-context affect indi-
43 vidual political participation and explain the mechanisms through which they
44 influence it. Since macro-contextual determinants of voter turnout have been well




FIGURE 2.1 Direct and indirect macro-contextual effects on individual political participation

1 studied, the text will primarily focus on reviewing the more recent literature on
 2 forms of political participation other than voting.

3 **What type of macro-context affects individual participation?**

4 Recognising that macro-context matters is only the first step. The necessary
 5 follow-up question is what characteristics of the macro-context are, and why and
 6 how they matter for political participation. Generally, the available studies on the
 7 macro-contextual determinants of individual political participation have
 8 focused on three main types of contextual determinants: formal political institu-
 9 tions, economic development and political culture. Figure 2.1 summarises the
 10 findings – both direct and conditioning effects – available in the literature. The
 11 macro-context can affect political participation directly, which is displayed by
 12 the direct arrow from the macro-context to individual political participation. In
 13 addition to that, the macro-context can also affect the processes within particular
 14 contexts, i.e. it conditions the effect of the lower-level determinants of individual
 15 participation. Available studies have explored how various characteristics of the
 16 macro-level context interplay with the effects of the above-mentioned explana-
 17 tions of micro- (SES and attitudes and values) and meso-level factors (networks
 18 and mobilisation).

19 **Direct effects of the macro-context**

20 ***Formal political institutions***

21 The micro-oriented research on political participation has tended to emphasise the
 22 similarities among individual types of political participation while using more or less
 23 the same micro-predictors, and points out the ‘conventionalisation/normalisation’ of

1 protest, which is nowadays similar to other types of political participation activities
2 (Dalton 2008; Norris 2002; Verba *et al.* 1995). However, when taking the macro-
3 contextual perspective, electoral and non-electoral political participation is viewed
4 as qualitatively different phenomena. This probably holds the truest in
5 the case of macro-institutional determinants. For instance, while elections are held
6 once every four years and are explicitly regulated by electoral laws, different
7 macro-level mechanisms probably correspond to protest and contacting officials,
8 which tend to take place between elections (Weldon and Dalton 2011: 16; Marien
9 *et al.* 2010). Political institutions have been widely studied as the main source of
10 cross-national variation in voter turnout (Dalton and Anderson 2011; Powell 1986;
11 Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Karp and Banducci 2008; Norris 2002;
12 Blais 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). The effect of institutional context on
13 non-electoral participation has been researched to a much lesser extent (Dalton *et al.*
14 2009; van der Meer *et al.* 2009; van der Meer 2011; Weldon and Dalton 2010;
15 Christensen 2011).

16 When theorising about the mechanism of how formal political institutions
17 shape individual political participation, studies mostly rely on rational choice
18 theory. The formal political institutions of the nation state should shape incentives
19 for non-participation, affecting individuals' costs and benefits of participation.
20 In the case of voting, authors usually expect that the macro-level context shapes
21 individual incentives to take part in elections by determining electoral costs, the
22 character of electoral choices offered and the chances of having an impact (Norris
23 2002; Dalton and Anderson 2011). In the case of electoral costs, the explanation is
24 straightforward: when electoral costs are reduced, casting a ballot should be easier.
25 The electoral choices play a role for voter turnout in several ways. A higher number
26 of options should motivate people to vote because they have a greater chance of
27 finding a party close to their views. The choices must also be distinguishable from
28 one another and predictable in order to motivate individuals to vote. Also,
29 situations that increase the chances of one vote having an impact should increase
30 electoral participation (Dalton and Anderson 2011).

31 Similarly, the social movement literature has relied on rational choice theory in
32 identifying the mechanism by which institutional political opportunities affect pro-
33 test and non-electoral participation in general. They expect that people participate
34 more when two mechanisms operate simultaneously: (1) when people's chances to
35 have an impact are increased; and (2) when people have a higher number of access
36 points for influencing politics (Koopmans and Kriesi 1995: 38–40; also Koopmans
37 1999: 97; for individual non-electoral participation, see Vráblíková 2014).

38 What institutions specifically affect political participation? Voter turnout research
39 has mostly dealt with the characteristics of electoral and party systems. Among the
40 factors that reduce the costs of casting a ballot, studies have found that automatic
41 registration, holding the elections on weekends and voting by mail can increase
42 voter turnout (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Norris 2002; Blais 2006).

43 Many studies have found that a proportional electoral system increases
44 voter turnout (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Karp and Banducci 2008). The exact

1 theoretical mechanism of how it affects voters' incentives is not clear (Blais 2006;
2 Dalton and Anderson 2011). Some explanations relate this effect to the higher
3 number of political parties typical of proportional electoral systems. However,
4 research has brought mixed results regarding the effect of multi-partyism (Geys
5 2006; Karp and Banducci 2008). For example, Jackman (1987) finds a negative
6 effect for a higher effective number of parliamentary parties on aggregate voter
7 turnout; he explains this by observing that voters do not decide the actual compo-
8 sition of the government. Others find a positive effect. Lijphart (1999) explains it
9 in terms of the inclusiveness of the consensual and cooperative culture produced by
10 institutional decentralisation in general. Other authors suggest that a higher number
11 of parties inspires citizens to vote because they have more options from which to
12 choose and the options offered better fit their needs, or because parties will be more
13 active in the mobilisation of individuals (Geys 2006; Karp and Banducci 2008,
14 2011; Blais 2006). Analysing individual voting in a multilevel study, Karp and
15 Banducci (2008) show that a proportional electoral system increases voter turnout
16 because these systems better represent minorities, produce stronger party prefer-
17 ences and increase political efficacy, while a greater number of parties in the gov-
18 ernment, though common in proportional electoral system, decreases voter turnout
19 by undermining efficacy due to the lower accountability and responsiveness of
20 political elites.

21 In addition to electoral laws and party system characteristics, Lijphart (1999)
22 also expects the general institutional design of the political system to affect people's
23 willingness to cast a ballot. According to Lijphart, consensual democracies
24 characterised by institutional decentralisation, such as horizontal and territorial
25 power-dispersion, corporate interest mediation and multi-partyism, support higher
26 voter turnout and participation in general, by increasing the inclusiveness of these
27 consensual and cooperational settings. Recent studies testing this theory on indi-
28 vidual voting in a multilevel setting do not find support for any of the indicators
29 measuring Lijphart's two dimensions of consociationalism (van der Meer *et al.*
30 2009; Weldon and Dalton 2010). In contrast to the expectations, neither institu-
31 tional decentralisation in the executive parties dimension nor in the federal-
32 unitary dimension affects individual electoral participation.

33 In the case of non-electoral political participation, researchers have not
34 researched electoral laws; instead, drawing on the political opportunity structure
35 literature from social movements or the literature on comparative institutions, most
36 have focused on the general institutional design of the state. Drawing on political
37 opportunity structure theory, Dalton and his colleagues (2009) show that the level
38 of democratic development measured as Rule of Law by the World Bank has a
39 linear positive effect on individual protest. However, when Welzel and Deutsch
40 (2012) retest this theory using a different measure of Voice and Accountability from
41 the Freedom House and control for emancipative culture and socio-economic
42 development, they find no effect of opportunities on individual protest. Christensen
43 (2011) operationalises political opportunities as various types of institutional decen-
44 tralisation, and expects it to increase political participation within the system, such

1 as contacting officials or party membership, and decrease protest. The findings are
2 rather mixed: some indicators of institutional decentralisation dampen individual
3 non-electoral participation, some increase it and others do not show any effect, thus
4 not following the expected different pattern between participation within and
5 outside the system.

6 Van der Meer and colleagues (2009) and Weldon and Dalton (2010) also study
7 institutional decentralisation, and explicitly aim at testing Lijphart's theory of
8 consociationalism. They expect that a culture of inclusion, consensus and efficacy
9 created by consociational systems should also increase non-electoral participation.
10 In line with Lijphart and his predictions for electoral participation, this expectation
11 relies on the voice mechanism, which expects decentralised systems to increase
12 inclusiveness. Van der Meer and others (van der Meer *et al.* 2009; van der
13 Meer 2011) also theorise a negative effect, because the opposite of consensual
14 institutions – majoritarian institutions – increase accountability, which should
15 motivate higher levels of non-electoral participation. The findings of the two stud-
16 ies do not consistently fit Lijphart's expectations. While consensualism measured
17 by the executive-party dimension weakens most non-electoral political activities,
18 the second federal-unitary dimension shows no effect or positive influence.

19 Drawing on a reconceptualised political opportunity structure theory, Vráblíková
20 (2012, 2014) argues that only some types of institutional decentralisation increase
21 non-electoral participation, and that the mechanisms by which they do so are not
22 inclusiveness, cooperation and consensus as expected by Lijphart. She distinguishes
23 between power-sharing and power-separation types of decentralisation and shows
24 that only the latter enhances non-electoral participation. The reason is that power-
25 separation, such as territorial and horizontal decentralisation, implies a competitive
26 setting with a higher number of veto players in the political system, which provides
27 participants with better access to the system and greater chances of being successful.
28 In contrast, the power-sharing type of institutional decentralisation, such as
29 multi-partyism or corporate interest representation, does not increase non-electoral
30 participation. Although they are inclusive and hence provide access, these settings
31 lack the element of competitive checks and balances that increases participants'
32 chances of being successful.

33 **Socio-economic conditions**

34 Macro-contextual studies of individual political participation have also examined the
35 effect of socio-economic development. There are several theories that explain the
36 effect of socio-economic well-being on participation. In general, all of the theories
37 more or less explicitly suggest two main mechanisms through which socio-
38 economic macro-contextual determinants affect individual participation. First,
39 macro socio-economic conditions contribute to the development of individual
40 resources, which are more stable predispositions for participation by individual citi-
41 zens. For instance, potential participants themselves are more educated or have more
42 time and capacity to devote to politics when socialised in a more socio-economically

1 developed context. Secondly, socio-economic macro-conditions also develop the
2 societal resources for participation. They shape the immediate but external sur-
3 roundings of individuals, such as the development of civil society and communica-
4 tion technologies.

5 The effect of socio-economic macro-conditions on individual electoral partici-
6 pation is usually studied from the standpoint of more or less explicitly formu-
7 lated modernisation theory (Norris 2002; Blais 2006). As Norris summarises,
8 processes such as mass education, urbanisation, the development of mass com-
9 munication technologies, secularisation, urbanisation and the development of
10 mobilising organisations such as political parties or trade unions should increase
11 voter turnout. The reason is that these processes lead to a higher politicisation of
12 individual citizens, who are therefore more politically informed and engaged
13 (Blais 2006). This theory sees socio-economic conditions from the long-term
14 developmental perspective, and is best suited to explain long-term variation in
15 participation (Norris 2002).

16 Several studies have shown that various indicators of socio-economic develop-
17 ment increase voter turnout (Blais 2006; Norris 2002). However, the trend is not
18 linear and a ceiling effect is observed. The influence is strongest when less socio-
19 economically developed societies are transforming into industrial ones. Here
20 socio-economic conditions strongly boost voter turnout. However, when a certain
21 point of socio-economic development is reached, the effect of socio-economic
22 development on voter turnout decreases and disappears. In post-industrial coun-
23 tries we no longer find an effect of socio-economic conditions on voter turnout
24 (Norris 2002; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998).

25 Socio-economic development is also positively related to non-electoral partici-
26 pation. There are a number of explanations available as to why this happens.
27 Inglehart's modernisation theory identifies the effect with the change of values and
28 culture resulting from the shift from industrial to post-industrial society (Inglehart
29 1990, 1997). The experience of existential security, autonomy in decision-making,
30 the development of cognitive skills and creativity, and the diversification of inter-
31 personal interactions in post-industrial societies should lead to a cultural value
32 change by which more people have post-materialist/self-expressive values which
33 correspond to more new forms of participation that are a post-materialist alternative
34 to the passive activities associated with elite-led hierarchical organisations such as
35 voting and party membership.

36 Dalton *et al.*'s study (2009) of the effect of socio-economic development on
37 individual protest sees socio-economic development through the lens of resource
38 mobilisation theory taken from social movement literature (McCarthy and Zald
39 1977). This approach focuses on mobilising organisations, such as social move-
40 ments, voluntary groups and NGOs, which recruit individuals into protest. Socio-
41 economic development should lead to a higher number of these actors, that is to a
42 more developed civil society sector, and increase the resources available to them for
43 mobilising individuals into protest participation, such as a skilled public interested
44 in politics, communication technologies and independent media.

1 Although closely related, the two perspectives are slightly different. While the
2 classical modernisation theory emphasises the development of post-materialist
3 values and culture across national populations, the resource mobilisation theory of
4 economic development stresses the role of intermediary actors and their capacity to
5 mobilise individuals without reference to the value component present in classical
6 modernisation theory. Contextual studies of non-electoral participation have not
7 yet examined the mechanism of socio-economic development in greater depth
8 to disentangle the two, and mostly use these modernisation-related indicators as
9 control variables.

10 **Political culture**

11 While formal political institutions and socio-economic conditions have been well-
12 researched in contextual studies of voter turnout and received some attention in
13 analyses focused on other participatory activities, the contextual role of political
14 culture on all types of individual participation has been heavily understudied. In
15 fact, there are very few studies that have systematically examined the effect of
16 national culture on individual political behaviour.

17 What is macro-political culture and how can it be expected to affect individual
18 political participation? In general, the topic of political culture has received much
19 attention in political science, and there are a number of available theories examin-
20 ing its effect on individual participation, such as theories of civic culture, social
21 capital and post-materialism (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1995, 2000;
22 Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The crucial point here is that
23 political culture is a macro-contextual phenomenon characterising societies and
24 political systems. Hence, although the measures used to indicate political culture
25 are constructed as the aggregation of individual-level attitudes representing the
26 countries' populations, they indicate a societal-level phenomenon which should be
27 conceptually different from individual attitudes. In doing this, contextual studies of
28 individual participation follow the classic conceptualisation of political culture as a
29 'particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the
30 members of the nation' (Almond and Verba 1963: 14–15). This is also related to the
31 political culture's mechanism of influence. The political culture perspective implies
32 that if political culture is to matter, then it should, in addition to affecting individual
33 participation through individual attitudes, also (and more importantly) affect indi-
34 vidual participation beyond the effect of individual predispositions.

35 Although contextual determinants of voting have been studied for decades,
36 almost all of the studies analyse institutions and economic development. Only a few
37 studies have looked at how national social capital affects voter turnout. Relying on
38 bivariate relationships of aggregated data, Putnam (2000) shows that the decline
39 over time in US voter turnout follows the decline of social capital. In contrast, van
40 Deth's (2002) cross-country bivariate analysis of aggregate voter turnout does not
41 find support for social capital theory. In a multilevel analysis of individual electoral
42 participation, Whiteley *et al.* (2009) find a negative effect of aggregate social trust

1 on individual voting, and no effect of aggregate group membership. A multilevel
 2 analysis by van Deth and Vráblíková (2013) shows the positive effect of an aggre-
 3 gated composite measure of social capital on individual voting. As they put it: ‘The
 4 general availability of a dense and active civil society offers easy access to trustful
 5 relationships and all kinds of networks, lowering the opportunity costs for engage-
 6 ment and compliant behaviour for all citizens in this society’ (van Deth and
 7 Vráblíková 2013: 8).

8 The contextual effect of social capital has also been studied in the case of other
 9 participatory activities. An analysis of aggregated protest by Benson and Rochon
 10 (2004) shows a positive effect of social trust. The multilevel analysis of Whiteley
 11 and his colleagues (2009) finds a positive effect of both aggregated social trust and
 12 group membership on individual non-electoral participation. However, they do
 13 not explain the mechanism by which the contextual effect works in greater detail,
 14 and treat the country-level social capital as the contextual parallel to the individual-
 15 level theory. Controlling for rival cultural explanations of self-expressive culture
 16 and economic and political development, Vráblíková (2012) finds no effect for the
 17 aggregated composite measure of social capital on individual non-electoral partici-
 18 pation. She links social capital to the previously mentioned power-sharing institu-
 19 tions, explaining that both of these characteristics produce a mechanism of
 20 consensus and cooperation which, in contrast to competition and contestation,
 21 does not increase non-electoral participation.

22 As already mentioned, one version of the modernisation theory stresses the role
 23 of post-materialist/self-expressive culture, especially for ‘elite-challenging’ types of
 24 political participation. This expectation has been supported by several studies. Both
 25 fully aggregate-level analyses and multilevel studies analysing individual non-
 26 electoral participation, found a positive effect for self-expressive/post-materialist/
 27 emancipative culture on protesting or other non-electoral activities (Benson and
 28 Rochon 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Deutsch 2012; Vráblíková
 29 2012). Multilevel analyses have also shown that self-expressive culture as a macro-
 30 contextual phenomenon has its effect beyond individual-level attitudes, i.e. it is the
 31 prevalence of these values in a given society that matters. Welzel and Deutsch
 32 (2012) explain that political culture works as a ‘mental climate’ because people are
 33 more exposed to these types of political participation, and the process of social
 34 contagion spreads it across all groups so that not only people individually possessing
 35 self-expressive values perform these activities.

36 Indirect conditioning effects of context

37 Macro-context shapes individual political participation not only directly, but also
 38 indirectly by affecting the influence of its micro- and meso-level determinants.
 39 From a different perspective, this means that the influence of the macro-context on
 40 individual citizens is not even, but affects different groups of citizens differently.
 41 For instance, education can have a stronger effect on individual participation in
 42 some contexts than in others, which means that the inequality among participants

1 is higher here. The question then asked by this type of analysis is: what contextual
2 determinants are responsible for this cross-contextual variation in the effect of indi-
3 vidual education on political participation? The available studies do not always
4 provide well-specified theoretical expectations about interaction effects. Rather,
5 they test a number of interactions in a more exploratory manner without a clear
6 specification of what mechanisms are responsible for the observed findings.

7 The contextual effect on the relationship between SES and participation has
8 already been examined by Verba *et al.* (1978). In their study of seven countries,
9 they show that inequality in political participation is affected by the strength of
10 mobilisation and cleavage structure of a particular country. Using the dichotomist
11 measure of closed and open political systems, which combines a number of various
12 types of institutional decentralisation, Christensen (2011) concludes that open
13 systems tend to decrease inequality in individual non-electoral participation, and
14 activate groups of citizens that are more politically passive in closed systems. In
15 contrast, Dalton *et al.* (2009) and Marien *et al.* (2010) obtained the opposite results.
16 More open opportunities (as indicated by the World Bank's Rule of Law indicator)
17 and a higher level of democracy (as measured by the Freedom House Index) amplify
18 the effect of education, indicating that participation is less equal in more democratic
19 and politically open countries. Similarly, higher socio-economic development
20 strengthens the effect of individual level resources (Dalton *et al.* 2009; Welzel and
21 Deutsch 2012), which means that the socio-economic inequality in non-electoral
22 participation is higher in wealthier countries.

23 Several studies have examined how the macro-level context affects the role of
24 individual attitudes for individual-level political participation. Dalton *et al.* (2009)
25 show that a more open political context, that is a higher score on the Rule of
26 Law indicator, strengthens the effect of Left-Right attitudes and post-materialism
27 on individual protest. Marien *et al.* (2010) show that a higher level of democracy
28 increases the role of political interest for individual participation. Despite well-
29 developed and strong theoretical expectations that consociational institutions
30 should diminish the ideological polarisation of participants because ideological
31 conflicts are less salient in these systems, van der Meer *et al.* (2009) do not find a
32 significant conditioning effect of institutions and several measures of Left-Right
33 attitudes on individual participation. However, some of the findings of Christensen
34 (2011) suggest that institutional decentralisation decreases the effect of some
35 pro-participatory attitudes. Only Dalton *et al.* (2009) look at how economic devel-
36 opment conditions individual attitudes. They show that both Left vs. Right ideo-
37 logical orientation and post-materialism have a greater influence on individual
38 protest in more economically developed countries.

39 Analysing the interplay between macro-level political culture and individual
40 attitudes, Welzel and Deutsch (2012) show that emancipative culture strengthens
41 the positive effect of individual emancipative values. They explain this effect in
42 terms of the mechanism of social confirmation. People possessing emancipative
43 values have more contacts in cultures with a high prevalence of these values, which
44 should reinforce the impulse of personal values to take part. Similarly, Vráblíková

1 (2012) shows that self-expressive/emancipative culture amplifies the positive effect
2 of a number of pro-participatory attitudes, such as political interest, political effi-
3 cacy, social trust and norms of good citizenship. Her results also show that a national
4 culture with a low prevalence of self-expressive/emancipative values deactivates
5 the positive effect of pro-participatory attitudes on individual non-electoral par-
6 ticipation.

7 In examining how the effect of the meso-level predictors of non-electoral par-
8 ticipation is conditioned by the macro-level context, available studies have looked
9 at the determinants of a diversified effect of voluntary groups and associational
10 membership and political discussion on individual participation. Dalton *et al.* (2009)
11 show that group membership has a higher effect on individual protest in countries
12 with more open opportunities (i.e. with a higher score on the Rule of Law indica-
13 tor) and in more economically developed countries. However, when Welzel and
14 Deutsch (2012) use the Freedom House Voice and Accountability index as the
15 indicator of open opportunities, they find no conditioning effect of group mem-
16 bership on protest. Using the two groups of open and closed opportunities com-
17 bining various types of institutional decentralisation, Christensen (2011) shows that
18 voluntary groups in closed systems are more likely to function as schools of democ-
19 racy because they produce more non-electoral participation than in open systems.
20 In contrast Vráblíková shows the opposite effect, with higher openness of political
21 systems as indicated by higher institutional power-separation (indicating more veto
22 players in the political system) increasing the role of group membership and politi-
23 cal discussion for individual non-electoral participation (Vráblíková 2012, 2014).
24 She explains that mobilising actors tend to activate social links for the mobilisation
25 of individuals more in these institutional settings because they have simultaneously
26 higher access to the political system and higher chances to be successful with their
27 demands. This interpretation also means that more open opportunities do not work
28 as an alternative to mobilisation by groups and acquaintances; rather, they amplify
29 the participatory gap between mobilised and non-mobilised citizens.

30 Discussion

31 The previous sections have reviewed the findings of the available studies of the
32 macro-contextual determinants of individual political participation. What are the
33 weaknesses, potential gaps and challenges that should be dealt with in future stud-
34 ies? We identify three areas in which we think valuable contributions are possible
35 for this stream of research: (1) theories; (2) technical solutions; and (3) new topics
36 and approaches.

37 The first comment is related to the role of theory in macro-contextual studies of
38 individual participation. Although a decade ago the biggest problem in studying the
39 macro context of individual political participation still seemed to be mainly techni-
40 cal because of the lack of statistical techniques that could effectively disentangle
41 the multilevel character of this research puzzle, paradoxically the problem seems to
42 be the exact opposite now. With the development of multilevel modelling and its

1 more-or-less easy application, researchers now have in their hands a very powerful
2 statistical tool which allows them to model very complex tasks. However, this type
3 of analysis is better suited for theory testing rather than for theory development.
4 Without an effective and well-specified theory of how particular macro-contextual
5 characteristics affect political participation and its determinants, one can easily end
6 up with models that are too complex.

7 This problem crops up especially in the case of potential cross-level interactions.
8 As we said before, most of the available studies tend to underestimate the role of
9 theory when developing and testing particular cross-level hypotheses. Very few
10 studies attempt to specify a theoretical mechanism of why and how a particular
11 macro-contextual characteristic should condition the effect of a given individual-
12 level predictor. More theoretical work could contribute by studying the direct
13 effect of macro-context on political participation, particularly with regard to com-
14 peting theories. The mechanism of how the contextual characteristics might influ-
15 ence individual level participation is not always precisely and clearly specified,
16 which leaves room for very general theoretical interpretations, including at the end
17 of the day almost every possible mechanism. Individual theories should be specified
18 more precisely and in more detail to make it possible to disentangle potentially dif-
19 ferent mechanisms of how the macro context affects individual participation. For
20 instance, the already identified difference between modernisation theory and
21 resource mobilisation theory is worth further investigation.

22 One way to develop our theoretical thinking further would be through careful
23 review of the results and discussions of existing studies. Increased communication
24 across individual studies would also help to solve other issues related to the techni-
25 cal tasks of macro-contextual studies. The literature on non-electoral participation
26 has not developed a standard portfolio of its predictors, which should be included
27 in all analyses at least as controls. As it is, the available studies differ in which
28 macro-contextual determinants they take into account in their models. Apart from
29 the problem that some of these models are probably underspecified and do not
30 provide reliable findings, another practical consequence is the difficulty of com-
31 parison across studies. Put bluntly, when a particular study reports that one macro-
32 contextual characteristic is an important determinant of individual non-electoral
33 participation, we cannot know whether this result is just a spurious correlation.

34 Another technical challenge for macro-contextual analyses is the relatively low
35 number of countries that are usually used at the second level of the multilevel
36 analysis. The problem is that when analysing a low number of cases, it is very likely
37 that the findings result from a few highly influential cases rather than describing the
38 general trend that holds for most countries (van der Meer *et al.* 2010). To avoid this,
39 a number of tests for checking influential cases are available (van der Meer *et al.*
40 2010) and it should become a standard procedure in this type of analysis to perform
41 these. More than half of the available studies do not check for influential cases.

42 As a third point, we want to outline several topics that have not been touched on
43 by the macro-contextual literature. Most of the available studies have been
44 limited to cross-sectional analyses of political participation among democracies.

1 This means that the role of time has not been explored for individual-level political
 2 participation. However, as shown mainly by the social movement literature,
 3 non-electoral participation varies heavily over time (Rucht 1998; McAdam 1999).
 4 Also, the context of non-democratic or semi-democratic regimes has not received
 5 much attention.

6 Another potential for new topics is that the notion of context need not be
 7 limited only to national countries, which are taken as the 'natural' units in the
 8 comparative social research and surveying industry. There are still unexplored
 9 puzzles and theories that better fit different levels of analyses. For instance, as
 10 already mentioned, not only the macro-context but also the meso-level context for
 11 individual non-electoral participation have yet to be studied more extensively. In
 12 this sense, a promising strategy may be found in complementing individual-level
 13 surveys with data on mobilising actors such as representatives of organisations and
 14 their members (Leighley 1996; Maloney and van Deth 2010) or the protestors and
 15 the mobilising actors organising demonstrations (Walgrave and Rucht 2010; van
 16 Stekelenburg *et al.* 2012).

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